GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-X9P5-W45C-7FFC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 19:50 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:58
VLAI
Summary
Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests
Details

Summary

The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.

Details

A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:

  • internal/context/auth.go reads c.Query("token")
  • internal/context/auth.go falls back to c.Query("access_token")
  • internal/context/auth.go only checks the Authorization header when the query token is empty
  • internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated

Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through c.IsTokenAuth checks: - internal/route/api/v1/api.go

Impact

If tokens are sent in URLs such as /api/v1/user?token=..., they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.

Recommended Fix

  • Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
  • Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
  • Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
  • A strict referrer policy should be set.

Remediation

A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.13.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26196"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-598"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T19:50:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as `token` and `access_token`, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.\n\n### Details\n\nA static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:\n\n  - internal/context/auth.go reads `c.Query(\"token\")`\n  - internal/context/auth.go falls back to `c.Query(\"access_token\")`\n  - internal/context/auth.go only checks the `Authorization` header when the query token is empty\n  - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated\n\nToken-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through `c.IsTokenAuth` checks:\n  - internal/route/api/v1/api.go\n\n### Impact\n\nIf tokens are sent in URLs such as `/api/v1/user?token=...`, they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.\n- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.\n- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.\n- A strict referrer policy should be set.\n\n### Remediation\n\nA fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T00:58:07Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T19:50:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/295bfba72993c372e7b338438947d8e1a6bed8fd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.