GHSA-X7M8-JRM8-HPVX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 15:06 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:06
VLAI
Summary
@eigenpal/docx-editor-react: CSS injection and print-time XSS via unescaped embedded font-family name
Details

Summary

Embedded font-family names (word/fontTable.xml) were interpolated unescaped into an injected @font-face <style> and into the print window's document.write(). A crafted name injects page-wide CSS on open, and breaks out of <style> into executable HTML on Print.

Impact

Opening a crafted .docx applies attacker-controlled CSS page-wide with zero clicks (overlay/phishing, attribute-selector exfiltration of input values, tracking beacons). Clicking Print escalates to script execution in the embedder's origin.

Remediation

Upgrade to 1.8.3. Font names are CSS-escaped before interpolation (quotes, backslash, < >, and CSS newlines), and the print window is assembled with DOM APIs instead of document.write.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@eigenpal/docx-editor-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@eigenpal/docx-editor-react"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T15:06:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nEmbedded font-family names (`word/fontTable.xml`) were interpolated unescaped into an injected `@font-face` `\u003cstyle\u003e` and into the print window\u0027s `document.write()`. A crafted name injects page-wide CSS on open, and breaks out of `\u003cstyle\u003e`\n  into executable HTML on Print.\n\n## Impact\nOpening a crafted `.docx` applies attacker-controlled CSS page-wide with zero clicks (overlay/phishing, attribute-selector exfiltration of input values, tracking beacons). Clicking Print escalates to script execution in the embedder\u0027s origin.\n\n## Remediation\nUpgrade to 1.8.3. Font names are CSS-escaped before interpolation (quotes, backslash, `\u003c \u003e`, and CSS newlines), and the print window is assembled with DOM APIs instead of `document.write`.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7m8-jrm8-hpvx",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T15:06:16Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T15:06:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eigenpal/docx-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-x7m8-jrm8-hpvx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/eigenpal/docx-editor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@eigenpal/docx-editor-react: CSS injection and print-time XSS via unescaped embedded font-family name"
}



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