GHSA-X6W6-M8VC-M6CP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-01 03:31 – Updated: 2026-08-01 03:31
VLAI
Details

The Subscriptions for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the save_meta_boxes() function persisting the _wps_plan_user_role membership plan meta from $_POST without an allowlist that excludes privileged roles — the only validations applied, sanitize_key() and wp_roles()->is_role(), both accept 'administrator' as a valid value, and the UI's disabled attribute on the role dropdown is a client-side-only control trivially bypassed via DevTools or a direct POST request; additionally, because the wps_membership_plan custom post type is registered with capability_type => 'post', any user who can edit posts satisfies the current_user_can('edit_post', $post_id) guard in save_meta_boxes(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their privileges to Administrator by storing 'administrator' as the role granted on membership acquisition, which the Pro companion plugin then applies via add_role() during membership lifecycle events. Successful exploitation requires the Subscriptions for WooCommerce Pro companion plugin to be active, as it is the component that reads the stored _wps_plan_user_role meta via get_post_meta() and calls add_role() to apply the role during membership lifecycle events.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15414"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-01T03:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Subscriptions for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in versions up to, and including, 2.0.0. This is due to the `save_meta_boxes()` function persisting the `_wps_plan_user_role` membership plan meta from `$_POST` without an allowlist that excludes privileged roles \u2014 the only validations applied, `sanitize_key()` and `wp_roles()-\u003eis_role()`, both accept `\u0027administrator\u0027` as a valid value, and the UI\u0027s `disabled` attribute on the role dropdown is a client-side-only control trivially bypassed via DevTools or a direct POST request; additionally, because the `wps_membership_plan` custom post type is registered with `capability_type =\u003e \u0027post\u0027`, any user who can edit posts satisfies the `current_user_can(\u0027edit_post\u0027, $post_id)` guard in `save_meta_boxes()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to escalate their privileges to Administrator by storing `\u0027administrator\u0027` as the role granted on membership acquisition, which the Pro companion plugin then applies via `add_role()` during membership lifecycle events. Successful exploitation requires the Subscriptions for WooCommerce Pro companion plugin to be active, as it is the component that reads the stored `_wps_plan_user_role` meta via `get_post_meta()` and calls `add_role()` to apply the role during membership lifecycle events.",
  "id": "GHSA-x6w6-m8vc-m6cp",
  "modified": "2026-08-01T03:31:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-01T03:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15414"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/tags/2.0.0/admin/partials/membership/meta-box-plan-details.php#L102"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/tags/2.0.0/includes/membership/class-wps-membership-plan-cpt.php#L275"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/tags/2.0.0/includes/membership/class-wps-membership-plan-cpt.php#L477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/tags/2.0.0/includes/membership/class-wps-membership-plan-cpt.php#L483"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3624543%40subscriptions-for-woocommerce\u0026new=3624543%40subscriptions-for-woocommerce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/195f86a5-e3dc-4414-bbe3-dea312bf30a9?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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