GHSA-WP87-MGVQ-5J93
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 20:21 – Updated: 2026-07-01 20:21An anonymous caller could create new namespaces and databases on a running SurrealDB instance without holding DEFINE NAMESPACE or DEFINE DATABASE permission.
USE NS <name> and USE DB <name> automatically create the target when it does not exist. The three places USE is handled — the RPC use method, Datastore::process_use, and the SurrealQL executor — did not check whether the caller was allowed to create the resource. Under default capabilities any session reached this path, including an unauthenticated guest.
Impact
What an attacker can do:
- Create new namespaces and databases without
DEFINE NAMESPACE/DEFINE DATABASEpermission. An unauthenticated guest is enough under default capabilities. - Recreate a parent namespace that an operator deliberately dropped, using a stale namespace-Editor token, by running
USE NS <dropped> DB anything. - Exhaust catalog storage by repeatedly creating new resources.
What it can't do:
- Read or modify data inside any pre-existing namespace or database.
- Escalate to root or namespace-owner privileges on existing resources.
- Affect deployments running with
auth_enabled=false.
Patches
All three USE entry points now check whether the caller has DEFINE NAMESPACE / DEFINE DATABASE authority before creating a missing target. Sessions still update their context regardless of authorization, so SDKs that send use before signin continue to work — only the catalog creation step is gated. The parent-namespace side-effect path is closed by the same check.
Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.
Workarounds
- Set
--deny-arbitrary-query *for guest principals to remove the entry point. - Run with
--authand require all callers tosigninbefore issuinguse. - Revoke namespace-level tokens promptly when a namespace is dropped.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "surrealdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:21:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An anonymous caller could create new namespaces and databases on a running SurrealDB instance without holding `DEFINE NAMESPACE` or `DEFINE DATABASE` permission.\n\n`USE NS \u003cname\u003e` and `USE DB \u003cname\u003e` automatically create the target when it does not exist. The three places `USE` is handled \u2014 the RPC `use` method, `Datastore::process_use`, and the SurrealQL executor \u2014 did not check whether the caller was allowed to create the resource. Under default capabilities any session reached this path, including an unauthenticated guest.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhat an attacker **can** do:\n\n- Create new namespaces and databases without `DEFINE NAMESPACE` / `DEFINE DATABASE` permission. An unauthenticated guest is enough under default capabilities.\n- Recreate a parent namespace that an operator deliberately dropped, using a stale namespace-Editor token, by running `USE NS \u003cdropped\u003e DB anything`.\n- Exhaust catalog storage by repeatedly creating new resources.\n\nWhat it **can\u0027t** do:\n\n- Read or modify data inside any pre-existing namespace or database.\n- Escalate to root or namespace-owner privileges on existing resources.\n- Affect deployments running with `auth_enabled=false`.\n\n### Patches\n\nAll three `USE` entry points now check whether the caller has `DEFINE NAMESPACE` / `DEFINE DATABASE` authority before creating a missing target. Sessions still update their context regardless of authorization, so SDKs that send `use` before `signin` continue to work \u2014 only the catalog creation step is gated. The parent-namespace side-effect path is closed by the same check.\n\nVersions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Set `--deny-arbitrary-query *` for guest principals to remove the entry point.\n- Run with `--auth` and require all callers to `signin` before issuing `use`.\n- Revoke namespace-level tokens promptly when a namespace is dropped.",
"id": "GHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93",
"modified": "2026-07-01T20:21:25Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T20:21:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/f3ee3bd55533c14f1fa3e69ce18fc8904c1ce3f9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SurrealDB: USE NS/DB implicit creation bypasses DEFINE authorization"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.