GHSA-W8MP-89WX-M5RW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:
if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {
sense_data += rsp_info_len;
par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;
}
rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of bounds.
The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in qla2x00_handle_sense():
if (sense_len > par_sense_len)
sense_len = par_sense_len;
memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);
so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap memory into the command's sense buffer.
Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89846"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:51Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read\n\nIn qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and\nshrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:\n\n\tif (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {\n\t\tsense_data += rsp_info_len;\n\t\tpar_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;\n\t}\n\nrsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target\u0027s FCP\nresponse (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area\nsize (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target\nreporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned\nsubtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of\nbounds.\n\nThe underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in\nqla2x00_handle_sense():\n\n\tif (sense_len \u003e par_sense_len)\n\t\tsense_len = par_sense_len;\n\tmemcpy(cp-\u003esense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);\n\nso the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the\nout-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap\nmemory into the command\u0027s sense buffer.\n\nClamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so\npar_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB\ndata area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both\nqla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.",
"id": "GHSA-w8mp-89wx-m5rw",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b08c0cb110a1fba92f99d655020198489699815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be75ab791c9b3baca66c70ce03443afebc83acda"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca6d880d6c70cb7946e7b3e05d7285f271b6d99e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7f7746ff031ae45724881261804f4bf5317c985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e57ace988bda5693f7b3645f652ea4b4220870ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebc41dfc59d190956e0113e8bd90c28f6f21e8b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6e8977bce887481b2b2b0e2e14a791270741cfb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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