GHSA-W7J5-J98M-W679
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:25 – Updated: 2026-03-03 22:25Three Dockerfiles in scripts/docker/ and scripts/e2e/ lack a USER directive, meaning all processes run as uid 0 (root). If any process is compromised, the attacker has root inside the container, making container breakout significantly easier. Partial fix (2026-02-08): Commit 28e1a65e added USER sandbox to Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser. The E2E/test Dockerfiles listed below remain unpatched.
Affected components: - scripts/e2e/Dockerfile - scripts/e2e/Dockerfile.qr-import - scripts/docker/install-sh-e2e/Dockerfile - scripts/docker/install-sh-nonroot/Dockerfile (runs as app but with NOPASSWD sudo — see related advisory)
Technical Reproduction: 1. Open each Dockerfile listed above and search for a USER directive — none found. 2. Run any of these containers: docker run --rm -it id 3. Observe: returns uid=0(root).
Demonstrated Impact: - Root inside the container enables kernel exploit attempts, volume mount abuse, and privileged syscall access. - Test images share the same base (node:22-bookworm) as production, creating risk of accidental deployment of root-running images.
Environment: Base images node:22-bookworm and node:22-bookworm-slim default to root. Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser were remediated in commit 28e1a65e; only the E2E/test images listed above remain affected.
Remediation: Add a USER directive before CMD/ENTRYPOINT in each remaining Dockerfile: RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash appuser USER appuser
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:25:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Three Dockerfiles in scripts/docker/ and scripts/e2e/ lack a USER directive, meaning all processes run as uid 0 (root). If any process is compromised, the attacker has root inside the container, making container breakout significantly easier.\n**Partial fix (2026-02-08):** Commit 28e1a65e added USER sandbox to Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser. The E2E/test Dockerfiles listed below remain unpatched.\n\n**Affected components:**\n- scripts/e2e/Dockerfile\n- scripts/e2e/Dockerfile.qr-import\n- scripts/docker/install-sh-e2e/Dockerfile\n- scripts/docker/install-sh-nonroot/Dockerfile (runs as app but with NOPASSWD sudo \u2014 see related advisory)\n\n**Technical Reproduction:**\n1. Open each Dockerfile listed above and search for a USER directive \u2014 none found.\n2. Run any of these containers: docker run --rm -it \u003cimage\u003e id\n3. Observe: returns uid=0(root).\n\n**Demonstrated Impact:**\n- Root inside the container enables kernel exploit attempts, volume mount abuse, and privileged syscall access.\n- Test images share the same base (node:22-bookworm) as production, creating risk of accidental deployment of root-running images.\n\n**Environment:** Base images node:22-bookworm and node:22-bookworm-slim default to root. Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser were remediated in commit 28e1a65e; only the E2E/test images listed above remain affected.\n\n**Remediation:** Add a USER directive before CMD/ENTRYPOINT in each remaining Dockerfile:\n RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash appuser\n USER appuser",
"id": "GHSA-w7j5-j98m-w679",
"modified": "2026-03-03T22:25:13Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T22:25:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w7j5-j98m-w679"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/28e1a65ebc580f07533966f5693f4df0a18d7085"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has multiple E2E/test Dockerfiles that run all processes as root"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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