GHSA-VMVQ-5QRR-GVG2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.
Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length\n\nmwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a\nbeacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that\nmany 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight\nfrom the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the\nelement\u0027s own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id\nalone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted\nRSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up\nto 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the\nkmemdup()\u0027d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe\nresponse is processed during scan-result parsing.\n\nPass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk\nto the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value\nbefore any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot\nunderflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.\n\nFound by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-vmvq-5qrr-gvg2",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2402c9e2644b7e10c7aaaf87bf12743d7e363559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46cda9d42f0d6ec3057d878ddb1f38c0ab9f51df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54a9cc5bd70b0d77a5069d4c46998c679a10c857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58767b41f87244eebaa5a475b9d276c83b89b933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77e642af7f2f6029e12a35c847c56cbd0466e799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8bbef2b1ebfbadc0b9c37bbbf9c9e26fe2e41960"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/982b8fcdbb28f63bbbf02f0822c0bbda12ec27ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e667aee1c192d67d27c803007bfa9c6e0873e959"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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