GHSA-RV39-79C4-7459
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 16:37 – Updated: 2026-02-17 16:37Summary
The gateway WebSocket connect handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated.
Details
In src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the presence of a non-empty connectParams.auth.token rather than a validated shared-secret authentication result.
Impact
In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.
Deployment Guidance
Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).
If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.2.1 - Fixed:
>= 2026.2.2
Fix
Device-identity skipping now requires validated shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.
Fix Commit(s)
- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575
Thanks @simecek for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T16:37:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.\n\n### Impact\n\nIn deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.\n\n### Deployment Guidance\n\nPer OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).\n\nIf the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Fix\n\nDevice-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n\n- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-rv39-79c4-7459",
"modified": "2026-02-17T16:37:04Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T16:37:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rv39-79c4-7459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s gateway connect could skip device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.