GHSA-RC52-C4HV-W89P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 16:52 – Updated: 2026-07-31 16:52
VLAI
Summary
Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook
Details

Impact

The shop payment webhook POST /{_locale}/update-payment (route sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: id (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and orderId (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.

An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid paid Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim orderId. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to completed (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.

### Patches Fixed in versions 2.2.8, 3.2.4 and 3.3.1. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is acknowledged with HTTP 200 and no state change is applied. HTTP 200 is intentional, because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response.

The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads both of them (mirroring CaptureAction):

  • payment.getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct flows, stored in CreatePaymentAction.
  • order.getMolliePaymentId() for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself (QrCodeAction).

Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their payment details carry no payment_mollie_id, so both sources must be consulted.

### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by decorating the plugin's webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie id matches the id stored for that order before handing over to the original controller, so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x.

#### Step 1. Create the decorator Create src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php in your Sylius project:

```php <?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\Controller\Mollie;

use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface; use Sylius\Component\Order\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface; use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PaymentWebhookController; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request; use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response;

final class SecurePaymentWebhookController { public function __construct( private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner, private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository, ) { }

  public function __invoke(Request $request): Response
  {
      $orderId = $request->get('orderId');
      $molliePaymentId = $request->get('id');

      if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) {
          return ($this->inner)($request);
      }

      /** @var OrderInterface|null $order */
      $order = $this->orderRepository->findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]);
      if (null === $order) {
          return ($this->inner)($request);
      }

      $storedMollieId = $this->resolveStoredMollieId($order);

      // Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order.
      // 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response.
      if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) {
          return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK);
      }

      return ($this->inner)($request);
  }

  private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string
  {
      $payment = $order->getLastPayment();
      $fromDetails = $payment?->getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] ?? null;
      if (null !== $fromDetails && '' !== $fromDetails) {
          return (string) $fromDetails;
      }

      // QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself.
      if (method_exists($order, 'getMolliePaymentId')) {
          $fromOrder = $order->getMolliePaymentId();
          if (null !== $fromOrder && '' !== $fromOrder) {
              return (string) $fromOrder;
          }
      }

      return null;
  }

} ```

#### Step 2. Register the decorator Append to your project's config/services.yaml:

yaml services: App\Controller\Mollie\SecurePaymentWebhookController: decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook public: true arguments: $inner: '@.inner' $orderRepository: '@sylius.repository.order'

decorates: keeps the original service ID, so the route _controller: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook keeps working with no route changes. @.inner is the original plugin controller.

#### Step 3. Clear the cache bash bin/console cache:clear

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "sylius/mollie-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "sylius/mollie-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "sylius/mollie-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68500"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T16:52:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T21:18:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie\u0027s API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim\u0027s order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is\n  acknowledged with `HTTP 200` and no state change is applied. `HTTP 200` is intentional,\n  because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response.\n\n  The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads\n  both of them (mirroring `CaptureAction`):\n  \n  - `payment.getDetails()[\u0027payment_mollie_id\u0027]` for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct\n    flows, stored in `CreatePaymentAction`.\n  - `order.getMolliePaymentId()` for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself\n    (`QrCodeAction`).\n\n  Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their\n  payment details carry no `payment_mollie_id`, so both sources must be consulted.\n\n  ### Workarounds\n  If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by\n  decorating the plugin\u0027s webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie\n  id matches the id stored for that order **before** handing over to the original controller,\n  so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is\n  made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x.\n\n  #### Step 1. Create the decorator\n  Create `src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php` in your Sylius project:\n\n  ```php\n  \u003c?php\n\n  declare(strict_types=1);\n\n  namespace App\\Controller\\Mollie;\n\n  use Sylius\\Component\\Core\\Model\\OrderInterface;\n  use Sylius\\Component\\Order\\Repository\\OrderRepositoryInterface;\n  use Sylius\\MolliePlugin\\Controller\\Shop\\PaymentWebhookController;\n  use Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\JsonResponse;\n  use Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\Request;\n  use Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\Response;\n\n  final class SecurePaymentWebhookController\n  {\n      public function __construct(\n          private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner,\n          private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository,\n      ) {\n      }\n\n      public function __invoke(Request $request): Response\n      {\n          $orderId = $request-\u003eget(\u0027orderId\u0027);\n          $molliePaymentId = $request-\u003eget(\u0027id\u0027);\n\n          if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) {\n              return ($this-\u003einner)($request);\n          }\n\n          /** @var OrderInterface|null $order */\n          $order = $this-\u003eorderRepository-\u003efindOneBy([\u0027id\u0027 =\u003e $orderId]);\n          if (null === $order) {\n              return ($this-\u003einner)($request);\n          }\n\n          $storedMollieId = $this-\u003eresolveStoredMollieId($order);\n  \n          // Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order.\n          // 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response.\n          if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) {\n              return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK);\n          }\n\n          return ($this-\u003einner)($request);\n      }\n\n      private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string\n      {\n          $payment = $order-\u003egetLastPayment();\n          $fromDetails = $payment?-\u003egetDetails()[\u0027payment_mollie_id\u0027] ?? null;\n          if (null !== $fromDetails \u0026\u0026 \u0027\u0027 !== $fromDetails) {\n              return (string) $fromDetails;\n          }\n  \n          // QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself.\n          if (method_exists($order, \u0027getMolliePaymentId\u0027)) {\n              $fromOrder = $order-\u003egetMolliePaymentId();\n              if (null !== $fromOrder \u0026\u0026 \u0027\u0027 !== $fromOrder) {\n                  return (string) $fromOrder;\n              }\n          }\n  \n          return null;\n      }\n  }\n  ```\n\n  #### Step 2. Register the decorator\n  Append to your project\u0027s `config/services.yaml`:\n\n  ```yaml\n  services:\n      App\\Controller\\Mollie\\SecurePaymentWebhookController:\n          decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook\n          public: true\n          arguments:\n              $inner: \u0027@.inner\u0027\n              $orderRepository: \u0027@sylius.repository.order\u0027\n  ```\n\n  \u003e `decorates:` keeps the original service ID, so the route\n  \u003e `_controller: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook` keeps working with no route\n  \u003e changes. `@.inner` is the original plugin controller.\n\n  #### Step 3. Clear the cache\n  ```bash\n  bin/console cache:clear\n  ```",
  "id": "GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T16:52:39Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T16:52:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/security/advisories/GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68500"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/pull/351"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/pull/352"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/pull/354"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/commit/01316b3ad3cf82e3c5ad160115d0a2cf89174e49"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/commit/153c754486b1bc597b67a90ac07ef71cd7958267"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/commit/d1f7753e92106e8bf3bedcfc61b02ea7b8e1c38a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/releases/tag/v2.2.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/releases/tag/v3.2.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sylius/MolliePlugin/releases/tag/v3.3.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.