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GHSA-QRGF-9GPC-VRXW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-20 21:18 – Updated: 2023-05-02 12:31
VLAI
Summary
Bypass of CSRF protection in the presence of predictable userInfo
Details

Description

The CSRF protection enforced by the @fastify/csrf-protection library in combination with @fastify/cookie can be bypassed from network and same-site attackers under certain conditions.

@fastify/csrf-protection supports an optional userInfo parameter that binds the CSRF token to the user. This parameter has been introduced to prevent cookie-tossing attacks as a fix for CVE-2021-29624. Whenever userInfo parameter is missing, or its value can be predicted for the target user account, network and same-site attackers can 1. fixate a _csrf cookie in the victim's browser, and 2. forge CSRF tokens that are valid for the victim's session. This allows attackers to bypass the CSRF protection mechanism.

As a fix, @fastify/csrf-protection starting from version 6.3.0 (and v4.1.0) includes a server-defined secret hmacKey that cryptographically binds the CSRF token to the value of the _csrf cookie and the userInfo parameter, making tokens non-spoofable by attackers. This protection is effective as long as the userInfo parameter is unique for each user.

Patches

This is patched in version 6.3.0 and v4.1.0.

Workarounds

As a workaround, developers can use a random, non-predictable userInfo parameter for each user.

Credits

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fastify/csrf-protection"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fastify/csrf-protection"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27495"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-20T21:18:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-20T18:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Description\nThe [CSRF](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf) protection enforced by the `@fastify/csrf-protection` library in combination with `@fastify/cookie` can be bypassed from network and same-site attackers under certain conditions.\n\n`@fastify/csrf-protection` supports an optional `userInfo` parameter that binds the CSRF token to the user. This parameter has been introduced to prevent cookie-tossing attacks as a fix for [CVE-2021-29624](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2021-29624). Whenever `userInfo` parameter is missing, or its value can be predicted for the target user account, network and [same-site](https://canitakeyoursubdomain.name/) attackers can 1. fixate a `_csrf` cookie in the victim\u0027s browser, and 2. forge CSRF tokens that are valid for the victim\u0027s session. This allows attackers to bypass the CSRF protection mechanism.\n\nAs a fix, `@fastify/csrf-protection` starting from version 6.3.0 (and v4.1.0) includes a server-defined secret `hmacKey` that cryptographically binds the CSRF token to the value of the `_csrf` cookie and the `userInfo` parameter, making tokens non-spoofable by attackers. This protection is effective as long as the `userInfo` parameter is unique for each user.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis is patched in version 6.3.0 and v4.1.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAs a workaround, developers can use a random, non-predictable `userInfo` parameter for each user.\n\n## Credits\n* Pedro Ad\u00e3o (@pedromigueladao), [Instituto Superior T\u00e9cnico, University of Lisbon](https://tecnico.ulisboa.pt/)\n* Marco Squarcina (@lavish), [Security \u0026 Privacy Research Unit, TU Wien](https://secpriv.wien/)",
  "id": "GHSA-qrgf-9gpc-vrxw",
  "modified": "2023-05-02T12:31:41Z",
  "published": "2023-04-20T21:18:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/csrf-protection/security/advisories/GHSA-qrgf-9gpc-vrxw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/csrf-protection/security/advisories/GHSA-rc4q-9m69-gqp8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27495"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/csrf-protection/commit/be3e5761f37aa05c7c1ac8ed44499c51ecec8058"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/csrf-protection"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/csrf-protection/releases/tag/v4.1.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/csrf-protection/releases/tag/v6.3.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2021-29624"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bypass of CSRF protection in the presence of predictable userInfo"
}



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