GHSA-QJ77-C3C8-9C3Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 16:44 – Updated: 2026-02-17 16:44
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw's Windows cmd.exe parsing may bypass exec allowlist/approval gating
Details

Summary

On Windows nodes, exec requests were executed via cmd.exe /d /s /c <rawCommand>. In allowlist/approval-gated mode, the allowlist analysis did not model Windows cmd.exe parsing and metacharacter behavior. A crafted command string could cause cmd.exe to interpret additional operations (for example command chaining via &, or expansion via %...% / !...!) beyond what was allowlisted/approved.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.1
  • Patched: >= 2026.2.2
  • Latest (npm) as of 2026-02-14: 2026.2.13

Details

  • Default installs: Not affected unless you opt into exec allowlist/approval gating on Windows nodes.
  • Windows execution uses cmd.exe via src/infra/node-shell.ts.
  • The fix hardens Windows allowlist enforcement by:
  • Passing the platform into allowlist analysis and rejecting Windows shell metacharacters.
  • Treating cmd.exe invocation as not allowlist-safe on Windows.
  • Avoiding cmd.exe entirely in allowlist mode by executing the parsed argv directly when possible.

Fix Commit(s)

  • a7f4a53ce80c98ba1452eb90802d447fca9bf3d6

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T16:44:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nOn Windows nodes, exec requests were executed via `cmd.exe /d /s /c \u003crawCommand\u003e`. In allowlist/approval-gated mode, the allowlist analysis did not model Windows `cmd.exe` parsing and metacharacter behavior. A crafted command string could cause `cmd.exe` to interpret additional operations (for example command chaining via `\u0026`, or expansion via `%...%` / `!...!`) beyond what was allowlisted/approved.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n- Latest (npm) as of 2026-02-14: `2026.2.13`\n\n### Details\n\n- Default installs: Not affected unless you opt into exec allowlist/approval gating on Windows nodes.\n- Windows execution uses `cmd.exe` via `src/infra/node-shell.ts`.\n- The fix hardens Windows allowlist enforcement by:\n  - Passing the platform into allowlist analysis and rejecting Windows shell metacharacters.\n  - Treating `cmd.exe` invocation as not allowlist-safe on Windows.\n  - Avoiding `cmd.exe` entirely in allowlist mode by executing the parsed argv directly when possible.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `a7f4a53ce80c98ba1452eb90802d447fca9bf3d6`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-qj77-c3c8-9c3q",
  "modified": "2026-02-17T16:44:11Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T16:44:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qj77-c3c8-9c3q"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a7f4a53ce80c98ba1452eb90802d447fca9bf3d6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s Windows cmd.exe parsing may bypass exec allowlist/approval gating"
}


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Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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