GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-MH87-9V73-FFWC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 15:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 15:31
VLAI
Details

Ransomlook contains a Redis glob pattern injection vulnerability caused by insufficient neutralization of user-controlled input before it is incorporated into Redis SCAN MATCH patterns.

The /api/health/ endpoint attempted to resolve the supplied name to a known group or market, but when resolution failed it fell back to using the attacker-controlled value directly in a Redis key pattern. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore supply Redis glob metacharacters such as , ?, [ or ] to broaden the SCAN operation beyond the intended group. For example, requesting /api/health/ could enumerate health information, mirror slugs, and uptime series belonging to all groups and markets, including entities marked as private.

Similar unsafe interpolation was present in /api/crypto/chain/ and in the delete_manual_torrent() function. The latter represents a potentially destructive sink because a crafted infohash containing glob metacharacters could cause the scan to match torrent-health keys belonging to other torrents if attacker-controlled input can reach that function.

The patch removes the unsafe fallback from the health endpoint and introduces glob escaping for user-controlled values before they are incorporated into Redis SCAN MATCH expressions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78378"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T14:17:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Ransomlook contains a Redis glob pattern injection vulnerability caused by insufficient neutralization of user-controlled input before it is incorporated into Redis SCAN MATCH patterns.\n\n\nThe /api/health/\u003cname\u003e endpoint attempted to resolve the supplied name to a known group or market, but when resolution failed it fell back to using the attacker-controlled value directly in a Redis key pattern. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore supply Redis glob metacharacters such as *, ?, [ or ] to broaden the SCAN operation beyond the intended group. For example, requesting /api/health/* could enumerate health information, mirror slugs, and uptime series belonging to all groups and markets, including entities marked as private.\n\n\nSimilar unsafe interpolation was present in /api/crypto/chain/\u003cchain\u003e and in the delete_manual_torrent() function. The latter represents a potentially destructive sink because a crafted infohash containing glob metacharacters could cause the scan to match torrent-health keys belonging to other torrents if attacker-controlled input can reach that function.\n\n\nThe patch removes the unsafe fallback from the health endpoint and introduces glob escaping for user-controlled values before they are incorporated into Redis SCAN MATCH expressions.",
  "id": "GHSA-mh87-9v73-ffwc",
  "modified": "2026-08-24T15:31:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-24T15:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RansomLook/RansomLook/commit/1f14c01b6fdf8d534edfb2790cf76f5bac6e73f8."
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…