GHSA-MFXH-VP55-7GC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:54 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:54ModuleRegistration::compile() reaches its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither FORM_SUBMIT nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and resendActivationMail() leads to OptInToken::send(), which has no rate limit at all.
Impact
Anyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for "this address has a pending registration on this site", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.
Honest bound. The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is tl_member.disable = 1 together with an unconfirmed reg- opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where reg_activate is off the branch is unreachable.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/core-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.50"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/core-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.4.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-107843"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-204",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:54:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site\u0027s own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.",
"id": "GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6",
"modified": "2026-10-09T20:54:04Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T20:54:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/security/advisories/GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/commit/2ea6117f9049db7221679251cfc41e67d941a74b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/releases/tag/5.3.50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/releases/tag/5.7.12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Contao: The registration module re-sends activation mails"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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