ghsa-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-12-02 20:04
Modified
2024-12-18 15:56
Severity ?
9.2 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library's `CookieStore` replaces explicitly defined `Cookie`s
Details

Summary

When making any HTTP request, the automatically enabled and self-managed CookieStore (aka cookie jar) will silently replace explicitly defined Cookies with any that have the same name from the cookie jar. For services that operate with multiple users, this can result in one user's Cookie being used for another user's requests.

Details

This issue is described without security warnings here:

https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964

A PR to fix this issue has been made:

https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033

PoC

  1. Add an auth Cookie to the CookieStore
    • This is identical to receiving an HTTP response that uses Set-Cookie, as shown in issue #1964 above.
  2. Handle a different user's request where the same Cookie is provided as a passthrough, like a JWT, and attempt to use it by explicitly providing it.
  3. Observe that the user's cookie in step 2 is passed as the Cookie in step 1.

Impact

This is generally going to be a problem for developers of backend services that implement third party auth features and use other features like token refresh. The moment a third party service responds by setting a cookie in the response, the CookieStore will effectively break almost every follow-up request (hopefully by being rejected, but possibly by revealing a different user's information).

If your service sets cookies based on the response that happens here, it's possible to lead to even greater levels of exposure.

Workaroud

You can avoid this issue by disabling the CookieStore during client creation:

java DefaultAsyncHttpClientConfig.Builder clientBuilder = Dsl.config() .setCookieStore(null) // other configuration ;

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.12.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0.Beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-53990"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-02T20:04:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-02T18:15:11Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen making any HTTP request, the automatically enabled and self-managed `CookieStore` (aka cookie jar) will silently replace explicitly defined `Cookie`s with any that have the same name from the cookie jar. For services that operate with multiple users, this can result in one user\u0027s `Cookie` being used for another user\u0027s requests.\n\n### Details\n\nThis issue is described without security warnings here:\n\nhttps://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964\n\nA PR to fix this issue has been made:\n\nhttps://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Add an auth `Cookie` to the `CookieStore`\n    - This is identical to receiving an HTTP response that uses `Set-Cookie`, as shown in issue #1964 above.\n2. Handle a different user\u0027s request where the same `Cookie` is provided as a passthrough, like a JWT, and attempt to use it by explicitly providing it.\n3. Observe that the user\u0027s cookie in step 2 is passed as the Cookie in step 1.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is generally going to be a problem for developers of backend services that implement third party auth features and use other features like token refresh. The moment a third party service responds by _setting_ a cookie in the response, the `CookieStore` will effectively break almost every follow-up request (hopefully by being rejected, but possibly by revealing a different user\u0027s information).\n\nIf your service sets cookies based on the response that happens here, it\u0027s possible to lead to even greater levels of exposure.\n\n### Workaroud\n\nYou can avoid this issue by disabling the `CookieStore` during client creation:\n\n```java\nDefaultAsyncHttpClientConfig.Builder clientBuilder = Dsl.config()\n .setCookieStore(null)\n // other configuration\n ;\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv",
  "modified": "2024-12-18T15:56:40Z",
  "published": "2024-12-02T20:04:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53990"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/d5a83362f7aed81b93ebca559746ac9be0f95425"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/blob/main/CHANGES.md#from-20-to-21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library\u0027s `CookieStore` replaces explicitly defined `Cookie`s"
}


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