GHSA-MFJ5-8WWQ-98RR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-08 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phonet: do not BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind() on failed bind
syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered from pn_socket_sendmsg() via pn_socket_autobind():
kernel BUG at net/phonet/socket.c:213! RIP: 0010:pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 [inline] RIP: 0010:pn_socket_sendmsg+0x240/0x250 net/phonet/socket.c:421 Call Trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x112/0x150 net/socket.c:797 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:812 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x402/0x590 net/socket.c:2280 ...
pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() with port 0 and, on -EINVAL, assumes the socket was already bound and asserts that the port is non-zero:
err = pn_socket_bind(sock, ..., sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn)); if (err != -EINVAL) return err; BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject)); return 0; / socket was already bound /
However pn_socket_bind() also returns -EINVAL when sk->sk_state is not TCP_CLOSE, even when the socket has never been bound and pn_port() is still 0. In that case the BUG_ON() fires and panics the kernel from a user-triggerable path.
Treat the "bind returned -EINVAL but pn_port() is still 0" case as a regular error and propagate -EINVAL to the caller instead of crashing. Existing callers already translate a non-zero return from pn_socket_autobind() into -ENOBUFS/-EAGAIN, so returning -EINVAL here only changes behaviour from panic to a normal errno.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-617"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T20:17:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: phonet: do not BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind() on failed bind\n\nsyzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered from pn_socket_sendmsg() via\npn_socket_autobind():\n\n kernel BUG at net/phonet/socket.c:213!\n RIP: 0010:pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:pn_socket_sendmsg+0x240/0x250 net/phonet/socket.c:421\n Call Trace:\n sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x112/0x150 net/socket.c:797\n __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:812 [inline]\n __sys_sendto+0x402/0x590 net/socket.c:2280\n ...\n\npn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() with port 0 and, on\n-EINVAL, assumes the socket was already bound and asserts that the\nport is non-zero:\n\n err = pn_socket_bind(sock, ..., sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));\n if (err != -EINVAL)\n return err;\n BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock-\u003esk)-\u003esobject));\n return 0; /* socket was already bound */\n\nHowever pn_socket_bind() also returns -EINVAL when sk-\u003esk_state is not\nTCP_CLOSE, even when the socket has never been bound and pn_port() is\nstill 0. In that case the BUG_ON() fires and panics the kernel from a\nuser-triggerable path.\n\nTreat the \"bind returned -EINVAL but pn_port() is still 0\" case as a\nregular error and propagate -EINVAL to the caller instead of crashing.\nExisting callers already translate a non-zero return from\npn_socket_autobind() into -ENOBUFS/-EAGAIN, so returning -EINVAL here\nonly changes behaviour from panic to a normal errno.",
"id": "GHSA-mfj5-8wwq-98rr",
"modified": "2026-07-08T06:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T21:32:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b0c911bcdbd982f7748d11c0b39ec5808eae2de"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6db58ee730bf434d1afca91b91826e26688856ed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.