ghsa-m98w-cqp3-qcqr
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-12-08 17:57
Modified
2025-12-12 16:30
Summary
Fiber Utils UUIDv4 and UUID Silent Fallback to Predictable Values
Details

Summary

Critical security vulnerabilities exist in both the UUIDv4() and UUID() functions of the github.com/gofiber/utils package. When the system's cryptographic random number generator (crypto/rand) fails, both functions silently fall back to returning predictable UUID values, the zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000". This compromises the security of all Fiber applications using these functions for security-critical operations on Go versions prior to 1.24.

Both functions are vulnerable to the same root cause (crypto/rand failure):

  • UUIDv4(): Indirect vulnerability through uuid.NewRandom()crypto/rand.Read() → fallback to UUID()
  • UUID(): Direct vulnerability through crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]) → silent zero UUID return

Note: Go 1.24 and later panics on crypto/rand Read() failures, mitigating this vulnerability. Applications running on Go 1.24+ are not affected by the silent fallback behavior.


Vulnerability Details

Affected Functions

  • Package: github.com/gofiber/utils
  • Functions: UUIDv4() and UUID()
  • Return Type: string (both functions)
  • Locations: common.go:93-99 (UUIDv4), common.go:60-89 (UUID)

Technical Description

The vulnerability occurs through two related but distinct failure paths, both ultimately caused by crypto/rand.Read() failures on Go < 1.24:

Primary Path: UUIDv4() Vulnerability

  1. UUIDv4() calls google/uuid.NewRandom() which internally uses crypto/rand.Read()
  2. If uuid.NewRandom() fails, UUIDv4() falls back to the internal UUID() function
  3. No error is returned to the application - silent security failure occurs

Secondary Path: UUID() Vulnerability

  1. UUID() directly calls crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]) to seed its internal state
  2. If seeding fails, UUID() silently fails and returns the zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
  3. Applications receive predictable UUIDs with no indication of the security failure

Code Analysis

UUIDv4() Vulnerability Path

go func UUIDv4() string { token, err := uuid.NewRandom() // Uses crypto/rand.Read() internally if err != nil { return UUID() // Dangerous fallback - no error returned to application } return token.String() }

UUID() Vulnerability Path

go func UUID() string { uuidSetup.Do(func() { if _, err := rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]); err != nil { // Direct crypto/rand.Read() call return // Silent failure - no seeding, uuidCounter remains 0 } uuidCounter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(uuidSeed[:8]) }) if atomic.LoadUint64(&uuidCounter) <= 0 { return "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" // Zero UUID returned silently } // ... generate UUID from counter }

Root Cause: Both vulnerabilities stem from crypto/rand.Read() failures, occurring through different code paths with the same dangerous silent fallback behavior.


Security Impact

Severity: CRITICAL

This issue is especially severe because many Fiber middleware packages (session, CSRF, auth, rate-limit, request-ID, etc.) default to utils.UUIDv4() for generating security-sensitive identifiers. A failure in crypto/rand would cause every generated identifier across the entire application to collapse to a single predictable value (the zero UUID), resulting in:

  • Session fixation / universal session hijack
  • CSRF token predictability and bypass
  • Authentication token replay
  • Global identifier collisions leading to severe application breakage
  • Potential application-wide DoS due to every request using the same “unique” key, causing cache overwrites, session stomping, corrupted internal maps, and loss of isolation across all users

Attack Scenario

While entropy exhaustion is extremely rare on modern Linux systems, RNG access failures (e.g., restricted /dev/random or /dev/urandom access, broken container environments, sandbox restrictions, misconfigured VMs, or FIPS-mode RNG failures) are realistic. In these scenarios on Go < 1.24, crypto/rand may return errors immediately — triggering the vulnerable fallback paths.

On Go 1.24+, crypto/rand Read() panics on failure, mitigating the silent-zero fallback issue.


Proof of Concept

  1. uuid.NewRandom() fails (indirect crypto/rand.Read() failure)
  2. UUIDv4() calls UUID() as fallback with no error returned
  3. UUID() seeding fails directly via crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])
  4. Zero UUID "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" is returned silently
  5. No error is propagated to the application from either function

Affected Versions

  • All versions of github.com/gofiber/utils containing the UUIDv4() or UUID() functions
  • Applications using Fiber middleware that depend on UUIDv4() or UUID for security
  • Only applicable to Go < 1.24; Go 1.24+ panics/block on crypto/rand Read() failures and is not affected

Mitigation

Immediate Workaround

Replace usage of utils.UUIDv4() with uuid.New() or wait for fix:

go sessionID := uuid.New()

Recommended Fix

Modify utils.UUIDv4() and utils.UUID() to fail explicitly when cryptographic randomness is unavailable:

```go func UUIDv4() string { token, err := uuid.NewRandom() if err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("utils: failed to generate secure UUID: %v", err)) } return token.String() }

func UUID() string { uuidSetup.Do(func() { if _, err := rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]); err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("utils: failed to seed UUID generator: %v", err)) } uuidCounter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(uuidSeed[:8]) }) if atomic.LoadUint64(&uuidCounter) <= 0 { panic("utils: UUID generator not properly seeded") } // ... generate UUID from counter } ```


Detection

Applications can detect if they're affected by:

  1. Checking if they use github.com/gofiber/utils
  2. Searching for UUIDv4() and UUID() usage in security-critical code paths
  3. Reviewing Fiber middleware configurations that rely on defaults of UUIDv4() for security identifiers

References


Contact

Reported by: @sixcolors


Classification

  • OWASP: A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures
  • Impact: Complete compromise of application security model on Go < 1.24
  • Exploitability: Medium (requires entropy failure)
  • Scope: All Fiber applications using affected middleware on Go < 1.24
Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2.0.0-rc.3.0.20251205210924-6c6cf047032b"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/utils/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0-rc.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/utils"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66565"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-252",
      "CWE-331",
      "CWE-338"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-08T17:57:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:18:21Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nCritical security vulnerabilities exist in both the `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` functions of the `github.com/gofiber/utils` package. When the system\u0027s cryptographic random number generator (`crypto/rand`) fails, both functions silently fall back to returning predictable UUID values, the zero UUID `\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\"`. This compromises the security of all Fiber applications using these functions for security-critical operations on **Go versions prior to 1.24**.\n\n**Both functions are vulnerable to the same root cause (`crypto/rand` failure):**\n\n* `UUIDv4()`: Indirect vulnerability through `uuid.NewRandom()` \u2192 `crypto/rand.Read()` \u2192 fallback to `UUID()`\n* `UUID()`: Direct vulnerability through `crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])` \u2192 silent zero UUID return\n\n\u003e **Note:** Go 1.24 and later panics on `crypto/rand` `Read()` failures, mitigating this vulnerability. Applications running on Go 1.24+ are not affected by the silent fallback behavior.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Affected Functions\n\n* **Package**: `github.com/gofiber/utils`\n* **Functions**: `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()`\n* **Return Type**: `string` (both functions)\n* **Locations**: `common.go:93-99` (UUIDv4), `common.go:60-89` (UUID)\n\n### Technical Description\n\nThe vulnerability occurs through two related but distinct failure paths, both ultimately caused by `crypto/rand.Read()` failures on Go \u003c 1.24:\n\n#### Primary Path: UUIDv4() Vulnerability\n\n1. `UUIDv4()` calls `google/uuid.NewRandom()` which internally uses `crypto/rand.Read()`\n2. If `uuid.NewRandom()` fails, `UUIDv4()` falls back to the internal `UUID()` function\n3. **No error is returned to the application** - silent security failure occurs\n\n#### Secondary Path: UUID() Vulnerability\n\n1. `UUID()` directly calls `crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])` to seed its internal state\n2. If seeding fails, `UUID()` **silently fails** and returns the zero UUID `\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\"`\n3. Applications receive predictable UUIDs with no indication of the security failure\n\n---\n\n### Code Analysis\n\n#### UUIDv4() Vulnerability Path\n\n```go\nfunc UUIDv4() string {\n\ttoken, err := uuid.NewRandom()  // Uses crypto/rand.Read() internally\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn UUID()  // Dangerous fallback - no error returned to application\n\t}\n\treturn token.String()\n}\n```\n\n#### UUID() Vulnerability Path\n\n```go\nfunc UUID() string {\n\tuuidSetup.Do(func() {\n\t\tif _, err := rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]); err != nil {  // Direct crypto/rand.Read() call\n\t\t\treturn  // Silent failure - no seeding, uuidCounter remains 0\n\t\t}\n\t\tuuidCounter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(uuidSeed[:8])\n\t})\n\tif atomic.LoadUint64(\u0026uuidCounter) \u003c= 0 {\n\t\treturn \"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\"  // Zero UUID returned silently\n\t}\n\t// ... generate UUID from counter\n}\n```\n\n**Root Cause:** Both vulnerabilities stem from `crypto/rand.Read()` failures, occurring through different code paths with the same dangerous silent fallback behavior.\n\n---\n\n## Security Impact\n\n### Severity: CRITICAL\n\nThis issue is especially severe because many Fiber middleware packages (session, CSRF, auth, rate-limit, request-ID, etc.) default to `utils.UUIDv4()` for generating security-sensitive identifiers. A failure in `crypto/rand` would cause **every generated identifier across the entire application** to collapse to a single predictable value (the zero UUID), resulting in:\n\n* **Session fixation / universal session hijack**\n* **CSRF token predictability and bypass**\n* **Authentication token replay**\n* **Global identifier collisions leading to severe application breakage**\n* **Potential application-wide DoS** due to every request using the same \u201cunique\u201d key, causing cache overwrites, session stomping, corrupted internal maps, and loss of isolation across all users\n\n---\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\nWhile **entropy exhaustion is extremely rare on modern Linux systems**, *RNG access failures* (e.g., restricted `/dev/random` or `/dev/urandom` access, broken container environments, sandbox restrictions, misconfigured VMs, or FIPS-mode RNG failures) are realistic. In these scenarios on **Go \u003c 1.24**, `crypto/rand` may return errors immediately \u2014 triggering the vulnerable fallback paths.\n\nOn **Go 1.24+**, `crypto/rand` `Read()` panics on failure, mitigating the silent-zero fallback issue.\n\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n1. `uuid.NewRandom()` fails (indirect `crypto/rand.Read()` failure)\n2. `UUIDv4()` calls `UUID()` as fallback with no error returned\n3. `UUID()` seeding fails directly via `crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])`\n4. Zero UUID `\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000\"` is returned silently\n5. No error is propagated to the application from either function\n\n---\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n* All versions of `github.com/gofiber/utils` containing the `UUIDv4()` or `UUID()` functions\n* Applications using Fiber middleware that depend on `UUIDv4()` or `UUID` for security\n* **Only applicable to Go \u003c 1.24**; Go 1.24+ panics/block on `crypto/rand` `Read()` failures and is not affected\n\n---\n\n## Mitigation\n\n### Immediate Workaround\n\nReplace usage of `utils.UUIDv4()` with `uuid.New()` or wait for fix:\n\n```go\nsessionID := uuid.New()\n```\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\nModify `utils.UUIDv4()` and `utils.UUID()` to fail explicitly when cryptographic randomness is unavailable:\n\n```go\nfunc UUIDv4() string {\n\ttoken, err := uuid.NewRandom()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Sprintf(\"utils: failed to generate secure UUID: %v\", err))\n\t}\n\treturn token.String()\n}\n\nfunc UUID() string {\n    uuidSetup.Do(func() {\n        if _, err := rand.Read(uuidSeed[:]); err != nil {\n            panic(fmt.Sprintf(\"utils: failed to seed UUID generator: %v\", err))\n        }\n        uuidCounter = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(uuidSeed[:8])\n    })\n    if atomic.LoadUint64(\u0026uuidCounter) \u003c= 0 {\n        panic(\"utils: UUID generator not properly seeded\")\n    }\n    // ... generate UUID from counter\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Detection\n\nApplications can detect if they\u0027re affected by:\n\n1. Checking if they use `github.com/gofiber/utils`\n2. Searching for `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` usage in security-critical code paths\n3. Reviewing Fiber middleware configurations that rely on defaults of `UUIDv4()` for security identifiers\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n* **Package Repository**: [https://github.com/gofiber/utils](https://github.com/gofiber/utils)\n* **Fiber Framework**: [https://github.com/gofiber/fiber](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber)\n* **Google UUID Library**: [https://github.com/google/uuid](https://github.com/google/uuid)\n* Golang `crypto/rand` behavior changes: [golang/go#66821](https://github.com/golang/go/issues/66821), [Go 1.25.5 source](https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.25.5:src/crypto/rand/rand.go;l=80)\n\n---\n\n## Contact\n\nReported by: [@sixcolors](https://github.com/sixcolors)\n\n---\n\n## Classification\n\n* **OWASP**: A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures\n* **Impact**: Complete compromise of application security model on Go \u003c 1.24\n* **Exploitability**: Medium (requires entropy failure)\n* **Scope**: All Fiber applications using affected middleware on Go \u003c 1.24",
  "id": "GHSA-m98w-cqp3-qcqr",
  "modified": "2025-12-12T16:30:26Z",
  "published": "2025-12-08T17:57:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/utils/security/advisories/GHSA-m98w-cqp3-qcqr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66565"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/utils/commit/6c6cf047032b9c8dff43d29f990b4b10e9b02d47"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/utils"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fiber Utils UUIDv4 and UUID Silent Fallback to Predictable Values"
}


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Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.


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