GHSA-JPVQ-8J5F-X4HH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: Fix inet6_addr_lst NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, inet6_addr_lst is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init() is called to initialize it. An attempt to bind an RDS socket to an ipv6 address results in a crash in __ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags()
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:__ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags+0x1df/0x7e0 Call Trace: ipv6_chk_addr+0x3b/0x50 rds_tcp_laddr_check+0x155/0x3b0 [rds_tcp] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x15d/0x2d0 [rds] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x110 rds_bind+0x1433/0x1d60 [rds] ? rds_remove_bound+0xd50/0xd50 [rds] ? aa_af_perm+0x250/0x250 ? __might_fault+0xde/0x190 ? __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210 __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210 ? __ia32_sys_socketpair+0x100/0x100 ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x53/0x100 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f47f8269ea9
The following code reproduces the issue:
struct sockaddr_in6 addr; s = socket(PF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); inet_pton(AF_INET6, ADDRESS, &addr.sin6_addr); addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; addr.sin6_port = htons(PORT);
bind(s, &addr, sizeof(addr));
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:22Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrds: Fix inet6_addr_lst NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled\n\nWhen booting with the \u0027ipv6.disable=1\u0027 parameter, inet6_addr_lst\nis never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init()\nis called to initialize it. An attempt to bind an RDS socket to\nan ipv6 address results in a crash in __ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags()\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]\nRIP: 0010:__ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags+0x1df/0x7e0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ipv6_chk_addr+0x3b/0x50\n rds_tcp_laddr_check+0x155/0x3b0 [rds_tcp]\n rds_trans_get_preferred+0x15d/0x2d0 [rds]\n ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x110\n rds_bind+0x1433/0x1d60 [rds]\n ? rds_remove_bound+0xd50/0xd50 [rds]\n ? aa_af_perm+0x250/0x250\n ? __might_fault+0xde/0x190\n ? __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210\n __sys_bind+0x1dc/0x210\n ? __ia32_sys_socketpair+0x100/0x100\n ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x53/0x100\n __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0\n ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50\n do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8\nRIP: 0033:0x7f47f8269ea9\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe following code reproduces the issue:\n\nstruct sockaddr_in6 addr;\ns = socket(PF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);\n\nmemset(\u0026addr, 0, sizeof(addr));\ninet_pton(AF_INET6, ADDRESS, \u0026addr.sin6_addr);\naddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;\naddr.sin6_port = htons(PORT);\n\nbind(s, \u0026addr, sizeof(addr));\n\nFound by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center\n(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.",
"id": "GHSA-jpvq-8j5f-x4hh",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00d5707217b5972554898ff734ae7b71bce704e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/438dec9b0a06bd1f8db8c58539c655e735e17367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7809344be3f0c1bbfdfdde1cefafeec14bf52d51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e48d7ab1e01936a172ff31531904b003895fd8c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c805e592a29be9e4e61ff1bd567da04aa8fd6f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8302e758050e6a922765aee8d220a4fd350f52d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b61c9eb5931bb7389bc104faacd8c17d910da65d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6787fdffcae5490c779f0f3f33b11597525d1ae"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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