Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-JPPW-R5J3-XF7X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:32

Details

Statamic CMS's user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the two_factor_recovery_codes handle that returns the user's raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: if ($handle === 'two_factor_recovery_codes') { return new Value($this->data->get('two_factor_recovery_codes'), ...); }. Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as {{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }} renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. Exploitation requires that dynamic Antlers rendering already be enabled on a field the target user's data flows through, which is a blueprint-configuration privilege rather than a standard content-editing permission.

Severity

6.2 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71293"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T13:24:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Statamic CMS\u0027s user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the `two_factor_recovery_codes` handle that returns the user\u0027s raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: `if ($handle === \u0027two_factor_recovery_codes\u0027) { return new Value($this-\u003edata-\u003eget(\u0027two_factor_recovery_codes\u0027), ...); }`. Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic\u0027s Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user\u0027s own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. Exploitation requires that dynamic Antlers rendering already be enabled on a field the target user\u0027s data flows through, which is a blueprint-configuration privilege rather than a standard content-editing permission.",
  "id": "GHSA-jppw-r5j3-xf7x",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T15:32:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T15:32:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms/blob/master/src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-71293 (GCVE-0-2026-71293)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 12:38 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:36

Title

Statamic CMS Unguarded Exposure of 2FA Recovery Codes via Antlers current_user Variable

Summary

Statamic CMS's user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the `two_factor_recovery_codes` handle that returns the user's raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: `if ($handle === 'two_factor_recovery_codes') { return new Value($this->data->get('two_factor_recovery_codes'), ...); }`. Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. Exploitation requires that dynamic Antlers rendering already be enabled on a field the target user's data flows through, which is a blueprint-configuration privilege rather than a standard content-editing permission.

Severity

6.2 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-200

Assigner

TuranSec

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/statamic/cms
https://github.com/statamic/cms/blob/master/src/A…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
statamic	cms	Affected: 0 , ≤ 6.23.0 (semver)

Credits

Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-71293",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-05T15:35:58.608812Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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          "programFiles": [
            "src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php",
            "src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php"
          ],
          "vendor": "statamic",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.23.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Statamic CMS\u0027s user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the `two_factor_recovery_codes` handle that returns the user\u0027s raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: `if ($handle === \u0027two_factor_recovery_codes\u0027) { return new Value($this-\u003edata-\u003eget(\u0027two_factor_recovery_codes\u0027), ...); }`. Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic\u0027s Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user\u0027s own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. Exploitation requires that dynamic Antlers rendering already be enabled on a field the target user\u0027s data flows through, which is a blueprint-configuration privilege rather than a standard content-editing permission."
        }
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      "metrics": [
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            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
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        "shortName": "TuranSec"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms/blob/master/src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Statamic CMS Unguarded Exposure of 2FA Recovery Codes via Antlers current_user Variable"
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
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    "datePublished": "2026-08-05T12:38:44.666Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-05T12:37:57.358Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

GHSA-JPPW-R5J3-XF7X

CVE-2026-71293 (GCVE-0-2026-71293)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature