GHSA-J99Q-5P83-43J8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov()
The VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a raw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently, adf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without stopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A concurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference freed memory.
This manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000260 by task kworker/24:2/... Workqueue: qat_pf2vf_resp_wq adf_iov_send_resp [intel_qat] Call Trace: kasan_report+0x119/0x140 mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 adf_gen4_pfvf_send+0xd4/0x1f0 [intel_qat] adf_recv_and_handle_vf2pf_msg+0x290/0x360 [intel_qat] adf_iov_send_resp+0x8c/0xe0 [intel_qat] process_one_work+0x6ac/0xfd0 worker_thread+0x4dd/0xd30 kthread+0x326/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x33b/0x670
Add a PF-local flag, vf2pf_disabled, that gates work queueing, worker processing, and interrupt re-enabling during teardown. Set this flag atomically with the hardware interrupt mask inside adf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(). After masking, synchronize the AE cluster MSI-X interrupt and flush the PF response workqueue before tearing down per-VF locks and state so all in-flight work completes before vf_info is destroyed.
Introduce adf_enable_all_vf2pf_interrupts() to clear the flag and unmask all VF2PF interrupts under the same lock when SR-IOV is re-enabled. This ensures the software flag and hardware state transition atomically on both the enable and disable paths.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64438"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:28Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov()\n\nThe VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a\nraw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently,\nadf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without\nstopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A\nconcurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference\nfreed memory.\n\nThis manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled:\n\n BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0\n Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000260 by task kworker/24:2/...\n Workqueue: qat_pf2vf_resp_wq adf_iov_send_resp [intel_qat]\n Call Trace:\n kasan_report+0x119/0x140\n mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0\n adf_gen4_pfvf_send+0xd4/0x1f0 [intel_qat]\n adf_recv_and_handle_vf2pf_msg+0x290/0x360 [intel_qat]\n adf_iov_send_resp+0x8c/0xe0 [intel_qat]\n process_one_work+0x6ac/0xfd0\n worker_thread+0x4dd/0xd30\n kthread+0x326/0x410\n ret_from_fork+0x33b/0x670\n\nAdd a PF-local flag, vf2pf_disabled, that gates work queueing, worker\nprocessing, and interrupt re-enabling during teardown. Set this flag\natomically with the hardware interrupt mask inside\nadf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(). After masking, synchronize the AE\ncluster MSI-X interrupt and flush the PF response workqueue before\ntearing down per-VF locks and state so all in-flight work completes\nbefore vf_info is destroyed.\n\nIntroduce adf_enable_all_vf2pf_interrupts() to clear the flag and\nunmask all VF2PF interrupts under the same lock when SR-IOV is\nre-enabled. This ensures the software flag and hardware state transition\natomically on both the enable and disable paths.",
"id": "GHSA-j99q-5p83-43j8",
"modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64438"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/218c2836b3987f3fa1d9eac505462cded0821e4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/277281c10c63791067d24d421f7c43a15faa9096"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/446b4d77599cf1a168573f7fb32a4a6aa4f09219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49cd5ac6de8de39a14ead609bb552d372d5602cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51144032248cc4ea22917370565650670b8b4e9b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d916c1eae1933511a69bffe243b4ee5d7da399c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e92b28cd74fa433658efeadf21b9d4b01023d7d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f344a369d0380d54c8d6c8d24734a78dd5a89817"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.