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GHSA-J6HJ-WVX2-8WQP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 15:31
VLAI
Details

In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a remote unauthenticated client can trigger a libngtcp2 assertion (if compiled with assertions on) and terminate the entire Unbound process using a single DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) connection and one normal DNS query. This is caused by an erroneous error value passed to libngtcp2. When 'ngtcp2_conn_writev_stream()' returns 'NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED', Unbound continues to call 'ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error()' with a '-1' error value. The 'int' literal '-1' is implicitly converted to the function's 'uint64_t error_code' parameter as '0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF'. The follow-on 'ngtcp2_conn_write_connection_close()' serialises that value as a QUIC variable-length integer; because '2^64-1' exceeds the 62-bit varint ceiling, 'ngtcp2_put_uvarintlen()' fails 'assert(n < 4611686018427387904ULL)' and the whole resolver process aborts. A remote, unauthenticated DoQ client can trigger this deterministically with a single QUIC connection by advertising 'initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 1' in its transport parameters and sending one DoQ query without ever reading the stream.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55991"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-195"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-22T14:17:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a remote unauthenticated client can trigger a libngtcp2 assertion (if compiled with assertions on) and terminate the entire Unbound process using a single DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) connection and one normal DNS query. This is caused by an erroneous error value passed to libngtcp2. When \u0027ngtcp2_conn_writev_stream()\u0027 returns \u0027NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED\u0027, Unbound continues to call \u0027ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error()\u0027 with a \u0027-1\u0027 error value. The \u0027int\u0027 literal \u0027-1\u0027 is implicitly converted to the function\u0027s \u0027uint64_t error_code\u0027 parameter as \u00270xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF\u0027. The follow-on \u0027ngtcp2_conn_write_connection_close()\u0027 serialises that value as a QUIC variable-length integer; because \u00272^64-1\u0027 exceeds the 62-bit varint ceiling, \u0027ngtcp2_put_uvarintlen()\u0027 fails \u0027assert(n \u003c 4611686018427387904ULL)\u0027 and the whole resolver process aborts. A remote, unauthenticated DoQ client can trigger this deterministically with a single QUIC connection by advertising \u0027initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 1\u0027 in its transport parameters and sending one DoQ query without ever reading the stream.",
  "id": "GHSA-j6hj-wvx2-8wqp",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T15:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T15:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55991"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2026-55991.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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