GHSA-J5WF-CPJP-5VX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 06:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid: ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end, leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants (ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32) after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T15:17:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check\n\nceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the\nbuffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:\nceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or\ncompromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with\nstruct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,\nleaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.\n\nThe immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has\nno preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past\nthe validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed\ndirectly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.\n\nThe sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants\n(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)\nafter its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the\nonly site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.\n\nFix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,\n*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.\n\nAttacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph\ndeployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client\nthat calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges\nbeyond OSD session establishment.\n\n[ idryomov: trim changelog ]",
"id": "GHSA-j5wf-cpjp-5vx9",
"modified": "2026-08-27T15:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T06:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00ead17c7de137a692edee59f2772e6af687e8eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c824e7c75bb4adf19553dd4ea944a5d83096be8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7130d94846dadbb97b6b7f4d78a3a7bba6e3daa1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85479b7d65b4ebcb07fbbe57230976793974ab4a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c59219a6b62d74936963983e5815524c3de8dd79"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb8246e5846dbbe34930903a90c7a90dd8e5910b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eab3eeb68bfc639d74f27256f05546af5c4f787d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f161be39201eb5f9b1f58fb8f90b8a9cd3931eb6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.