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GHSA-J48G-PW4C-X8JM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-24 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

cxl: Fix race of nvdimm_bus object when creating nvdimm objects

Found issue during running of cxl-translate.sh unit test. Adding a 3s sleep right before the test seems to make the issue reproduce fairly consistently. The cxl_translate module has dependency on cxl_acpi and causes orphaned nvdimm objects to reprobe after cxl_acpi is removed. The nvdimm_bus object is registered by the cxl_nvb object when cxl_acpi_probe() is called. With the nvdimm_bus object missing, __nd_device_register() will trigger NULL pointer dereference when accessing the dev->parent that points to &nvdimm_bus->dev.

[ 192.884510] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000006c [ 192.895383] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025 [ 192.897721] Workqueue: cxl_port cxl_bus_rescan_queue [cxl_core] [ 192.899459] RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0xc/0x90 [ 192.924871] Call Trace: [ 192.925959] [ 192.926976] ? pm_runtime_init+0xb9/0xe0 [ 192.929712] __nd_device_register.part.0+0x4d/0xc0 [libnvdimm] [ 192.933314] __nvdimm_create+0x206/0x290 [libnvdimm] [ 192.936662] cxl_nvdimm_probe+0x119/0x1d0 [cxl_pmem] [ 192.940245] cxl_bus_probe+0x1a/0x60 [cxl_core] [ 192.943349] really_probe+0xde/0x380

This patch also relies on the previous change where devm_cxl_add_nvdimm_bridge() is called from drivers/cxl/pmem.c instead of drivers/cxl/core.c to ensure the dependency of cxl_acpi on cxl_pmem.

  1. Set probe_type of cxl_nvb to PROBE_FORCE_SYNCHRONOUS to ensure the driver is probed synchronously when add_device() is called.
  2. Add a check in __devm_cxl_add_nvdimm_bridge() to ensure that the cxl_nvb driver is attached during cxl_acpi_probe().
  3. Take the cxl_root uport_dev lock and the cxl_nvb->dev lock in devm_cxl_add_nvdimm() before checking nvdimm_bus is valid.
  4. Set cxl_nvdimm flag to CXL_NVD_F_INVALIDATED so cxl_nvdimm_probe() will exit with -EBUSY.

The removal of cxl_nvdimm devices should prevent any orphaned devices from probing once the nvdimm_bus is gone.

[ dj: Fixed 0-day reported kdoc issue. ] [ dj: Fix cxl_nvb reference leak on error. Gregory (kreview-0811365) ]

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23348"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl: Fix race of nvdimm_bus object when creating nvdimm objects\n\nFound issue during running of cxl-translate.sh unit test. Adding a 3s\nsleep right before the test seems to make the issue reproduce fairly\nconsistently. The cxl_translate module has dependency on cxl_acpi and\ncauses orphaned nvdimm objects to reprobe after cxl_acpi is removed.\nThe nvdimm_bus object is registered by the cxl_nvb object when\ncxl_acpi_probe() is called. With the nvdimm_bus object missing,\n__nd_device_register() will trigger NULL pointer dereference when\naccessing the dev-\u003eparent that points to \u0026nvdimm_bus-\u003edev.\n\n[  192.884510] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000006c\n[  192.895383] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025\n[  192.897721] Workqueue: cxl_port cxl_bus_rescan_queue [cxl_core]\n[  192.899459] RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0xc/0x90\n[  192.924871] Call Trace:\n[  192.925959]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[  192.926976]  ? pm_runtime_init+0xb9/0xe0\n[  192.929712]  __nd_device_register.part.0+0x4d/0xc0 [libnvdimm]\n[  192.933314]  __nvdimm_create+0x206/0x290 [libnvdimm]\n[  192.936662]  cxl_nvdimm_probe+0x119/0x1d0 [cxl_pmem]\n[  192.940245]  cxl_bus_probe+0x1a/0x60 [cxl_core]\n[  192.943349]  really_probe+0xde/0x380\n\nThis patch also relies on the previous change where\ndevm_cxl_add_nvdimm_bridge() is called from drivers/cxl/pmem.c instead\nof drivers/cxl/core.c to ensure the dependency of cxl_acpi on cxl_pmem.\n\n1. Set probe_type of cxl_nvb to PROBE_FORCE_SYNCHRONOUS to ensure the\n   driver is probed synchronously when add_device() is called.\n2. Add a check in __devm_cxl_add_nvdimm_bridge() to ensure that the\n   cxl_nvb driver is attached during cxl_acpi_probe().\n3. Take the cxl_root uport_dev lock and the cxl_nvb-\u003edev lock in\n   devm_cxl_add_nvdimm() before checking nvdimm_bus is valid.\n4. Set cxl_nvdimm flag to CXL_NVD_F_INVALIDATED so cxl_nvdimm_probe()\n   will exit with -EBUSY.\n\nThe removal of cxl_nvdimm devices should prevent any orphaned devices\nfrom probing once the nvdimm_bus is gone.\n\n[ dj: Fixed 0-day reported kdoc issue. ]\n[ dj: Fix cxl_nvb reference leak on error. Gregory (kreview-0811365) ]",
  "id": "GHSA-j48g-pw4c-x8jm",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T18:30:40Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T12:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23348"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b230daeee420833287cc77314439903e5312f10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5fc4e150c5ada5f7d20d8f9f1b351f10481fbdf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96a1fd0d84b17360840f344826897fa71049870e"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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