GHSA-HVM9-WC8J-MGRC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-18 18:19 – Updated: 2024-12-18 18:19
VLAI
Summary
TShock Security Escalation Exploit
Details

Impact

An issue with the way OTAPI manages client connections results in stale UUIDs remaining on RemoteClient instances after a player disconnects.

Because of this, if the following conditions are met a player may assume the login state of a previously connected player: 1. The server has UUID login enabled 2. An authenticated player disconnects 3. A subsequent player connects with a modified client that does not send the ClientUUID#68 packet during connection 4. The server assigns the same RemoteClient object that belonged to the originally authenticated player to the newly connected player

Patches

TShock 5.2.1 hotfixes this issue. A more robust fix will be made to OTAPI itself.

Workarounds

Implement a RemoteClient reset event handler in a plugin like so:

public override void Initialize()
{
        On.Terraria.RemoteClient.Reset += RemoteClient_Reset;
}

private static void RemoteClient_Reset(On.Terraria.RemoteClient.orig_Reset orig, RemoteClient client)
{
    client.ClientUUID = null;
        orig(client);
}
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "TShock"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.3.21"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-305",
      "CWE-613",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-18T18:19:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn issue with the way OTAPI manages client connections results in stale UUIDs remaining on `RemoteClient` instances after a player disconnects.\n\nBecause of this, if the following conditions are met a player may assume the login state of a previously connected player:\n1. The server has UUID login enabled\n2. An authenticated player disconnects\n3. A subsequent player connects with a modified client that does not send the `ClientUUID#68` packet during connection\n4. The server assigns the same `RemoteClient` object that belonged to the originally authenticated player to the newly connected player\n\n\n### Patches\nTShock 5.2.1 hotfixes this issue. A more robust fix will be made to OTAPI itself.\n\n### Workarounds\nImplement a RemoteClient reset event handler in a plugin like so:\n```csharp\npublic override void Initialize()\n{\n        On.Terraria.RemoteClient.Reset += RemoteClient_Reset;\n}\n\nprivate static void RemoteClient_Reset(On.Terraria.RemoteClient.orig_Reset orig, RemoteClient client)\n{\n\tclient.ClientUUID = null;\n        orig(client);\n}\n```\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-hvm9-wc8j-mgrc",
  "modified": "2024-12-18T18:19:12Z",
  "published": "2024-12-18T18:19:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Pryaxis/TShock/security/advisories/GHSA-hvm9-wc8j-mgrc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Pryaxis/TShock/commit/5075997264b48e27960e3446a948ecb0ea0f5a03"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Pryaxis/TShock"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "TShock Security Escalation Exploit"
}



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