GHSA-HFQP-M279-7MJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 18:31Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl return corrupted dates via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in check.
The parse regexes capture year, month and day with the \d shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode decimal digit property \p{Nd} and not just [0-9]. Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with numeric comparisons alone ($y<1 || $y>9999, $m<1 || $m>12, $d<1 || $d>$days), and _parse_check stores the numified fields ($y+0). Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour, minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes (0?[0-9], [0-5][0-9]) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction.
Any caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or Date::Manip::Date->parse() can get back a date that differs from the string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes unnoticed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60074"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1289"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T14:17:02Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl return corrupted dates via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in check.\n\nThe parse regexes capture year, month and day with the `\\d` shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode decimal digit property `\\p{Nd}` and not just `[0-9]`. Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with numeric comparisons alone (`$y\u003c1 || $y\u003e9999`, `$m\u003c1 || $m\u003e12`, `$d\u003c1 || $d\u003e$days`), and _parse_check stores the numified fields (`$y+0`). Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour, minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes (`0?[0-9]`, `[0-5][0-9]`) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction.\n\nAny caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or Date::Manip::Date-\u003eparse() can get back a date that differs from the string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes unnoticed.",
"id": "GHSA-hfqp-m279-7mj7",
"modified": "2026-07-30T18:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T15:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60074"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/SBECK/Date-Manip-6.99/source/lib/Date/Manip/Base.pm#L602-614"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/SBECK/Date-Manip-6.99/source/lib/Date/Manip/Date.pm#L1536-1539"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.metacpan.org/patches/D/Date-Manip/6.99/CVE-2026-60074-r1.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/30/19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.