GHSA-GRP3-H8M8-45P7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 15:18 – Updated: 2026-04-21 15:18
VLAI
Summary
Glances has CQL Injection in its Cassandra Export Module via Unsanitized Config Values
Details

Summary

The Cassandra export module (glances/exports/glances_cassandra/__init__.py) interpolates keyspace, table, and replication_factor configuration values directly into CQL statements without validation. A user with write access to glances.conf can redirect all monitoring data to an attacker-controlled Cassandra keyspace.

Vulnerable Code

# Line 80
f"CREATE KEYSPACE {self.keyspace} WITH "
f"replication = {{ 'class': 'SimpleStrategy', 'replication_factor': '{self.replication_factor}' }}"

# Line 94
f"CREATE TABLE {self.table} (plugin text, time timeuuid, stat map<text,float>, PRIMARY KEY (plugin, time)) WITH CLUSTERING ORDER BY (time DESC)"

# Line 112
stmt = f"INSERT INTO {self.table} (plugin, time, stat) VALUES (?, ?, ?)"

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Configure glances.conf with malicious table value:
[cassandra]
host = 127.0.0.1
port = 9042
keyspace = glances
table = attacker_ks.captured_stats
  1. Create attacker keyspace in Cassandra
  2. Run glances --export cassandra
  3. All monitoring data is written to attacker_ks.captured_stats instead of the legitimate table

Confirmed output:

INSERT stmt: INSERT INTO attacker_ks.captured_stats (plugin, time, stat) VALUES (?, ?, ?)
Legitimate table row count: 0
Attacker table row count: 1
[CONFIRMED] plugin=cpu, stat={'user': 50.0}

Impact

All exported monitoring data (CPU, memory, network, disk I/O) is silently redirected to an attacker-controlled Cassandra keyspace — both data exfiltration and data loss.

Proposed Fix

import re

def _validate_cql_identifier(name: str) -> str:
    if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_.]*$', name):
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid CQL identifier: {name!r}")
    return name

# In __init__(): validate before use
self.keyspace = _validate_cql_identifier(self.keyspace)
self.table = _validate_cql_identifier(self.table)

PoC

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35588"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T15:18:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T00:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Cassandra export module (`glances/exports/glances_cassandra/__init__.py`) interpolates `keyspace`, `table`, and `replication_factor` configuration values directly into CQL statements without validation. A user with write access to `glances.conf` can redirect all monitoring data to an attacker-controlled Cassandra keyspace.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n```python\n# Line 80\nf\"CREATE KEYSPACE {self.keyspace} WITH \"\nf\"replication = {{ \u0027class\u0027: \u0027SimpleStrategy\u0027, \u0027replication_factor\u0027: \u0027{self.replication_factor}\u0027 }}\"\n\n# Line 94\nf\"CREATE TABLE {self.table} (plugin text, time timeuuid, stat map\u003ctext,float\u003e, PRIMARY KEY (plugin, time)) WITH CLUSTERING ORDER BY (time DESC)\"\n\n# Line 112\nstmt = f\"INSERT INTO {self.table} (plugin, time, stat) VALUES (?, ?, ?)\"\n```\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Configure `glances.conf` with malicious `table` value:\n```ini\n[cassandra]\nhost = 127.0.0.1\nport = 9042\nkeyspace = glances\ntable = attacker_ks.captured_stats\n```\n2. Create attacker keyspace in Cassandra\n3. Run `glances --export cassandra`\n4. All monitoring data is written to `attacker_ks.captured_stats` instead of the legitimate table\n\n**Confirmed output:**\n```\nINSERT stmt: INSERT INTO attacker_ks.captured_stats (plugin, time, stat) VALUES (?, ?, ?)\nLegitimate table row count: 0\nAttacker table row count: 1\n[CONFIRMED] plugin=cpu, stat={\u0027user\u0027: 50.0}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAll exported monitoring data (CPU, memory, network, disk I/O) is silently redirected to an attacker-controlled Cassandra keyspace \u2014 both data exfiltration and data loss.\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\n```python\nimport re\n\ndef _validate_cql_identifier(name: str) -\u003e str:\n    if not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_.]*$\u0027, name):\n        raise ValueError(f\"Invalid CQL identifier: {name!r}\")\n    return name\n\n# In __init__(): validate before use\nself.keyspace = _validate_cql_identifier(self.keyspace)\nself.table = _validate_cql_identifier(self.table)\n```\n\n![PoC](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/n0z0/cve-evidence/main/2026-04/20260403_004238_glances_cassandra_cql_injection_poc.png)",
  "id": "GHSA-grp3-h8m8-45p7",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T15:18:58Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T15:18:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-grp3-h8m8-45p7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/d339181f03a14bb15506307e9d58f876e23d8160"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/e41b665576f9fd5374e3152078726cc59a01e48c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances has CQL Injection in its Cassandra Export Module via Unsanitized Config Values"
}



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