GHSA-FXVF-VM38-6PXW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key

ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.

With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.

Relevant path:

smb2_sess_setup() -> conn->binding = true -> ntlm_authenticate() -> session_user() -> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() -> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() -> calc_ntlmv2_hash() -> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key) -> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch -> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...) -> out_err without expiring the binding session

Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64389"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:22Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key\n\nksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into\nsess-\u003esess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.\nksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even\nwhen ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.\n\nWith SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on\nan existing session and the session setup error path does not expire\nbinding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a\nbad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-\u003esess_key before\nSTATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.\n\nRelevant path:\n\n  smb2_sess_setup()\n    -\u003e conn-\u003ebinding = true\n    -\u003e ntlm_authenticate()\n       -\u003e session_user()\n       -\u003e ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()\n          -\u003e ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()\n             -\u003e calc_ntlmv2_hash()\n             -\u003e hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-\u003esess_key)\n             -\u003e crypto_memneq() returns mismatch\n          -\u003e KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-\u003esess_key, ...)\n    -\u003e out_err without expiring the binding session\n\nDerive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to\nsess-\u003esess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on\nauthentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful\nauthentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-fxvf-vm38-6pxw",
  "modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89ca7756d5566ba636bb9092cdbe57dab095e136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/954d196bebb2b50151cb96454c72dc113b2af1ac"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b56400364aed5c34d6e1a0b493081290a5328a9c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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