GHSA-FP4W-89FW-H8P4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: swap_cgroup: fix NULL deref in lookup_swap_cgroup_id on swapless host
lookup_swap_cgroup_id() passes swap_cgroup_ctrl[type].map to __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() without checking that the type was ever registered via swap_cgroup_swapon(). On a swapless host every ctrl->map is NULL, so __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() dereferences NULL + a scaled swp_offset().
Since commit bea67dcc5eea ("mm: attempt to batch free swap entries for zap_pte_range()"), zap_pte_range() -> swap_pte_batch() calls lookup_swap_cgroup_id() on any non-present, non-none PTE that decodes as a real swap entry, without first validating it against swap_info[]. A single PTE corrupted into a type-0 swap entry takes the host down at process exit.
We hit this in production on a swapless 6.12.58 host: ~1s of "get_swap_device: Bad swap file entry 3f800204222bb" (do_swap_page() being correctly defensive about the same entry) followed by
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000003f800204220 RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x2b/0x60 Call Trace: swap_pte_batch+0xbf/0x230 zap_pte_range+0x4c8/0x780 unmap_page_range+0x190/0x3e0 exit_mmap+0xd9/0x3c0 do_exit+0x20c/0x4b0
syzbot has reported the identical stack.
The source of the PTE corruption is a separate bug; this change makes the teardown path as robust as the fault path already is. Every other caller of lookup_swap_cgroup_id() is downstream of a get_swap_device() that has already validated the entry, so the new branch is cold.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64416"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:25Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: swap_cgroup: fix NULL deref in lookup_swap_cgroup_id on swapless host\n\nlookup_swap_cgroup_id() passes swap_cgroup_ctrl[type].map to\n__swap_cgroup_id_lookup() without checking that the type was ever\nregistered via swap_cgroup_swapon(). On a swapless host every ctrl-\u003emap\nis NULL, so __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() dereferences NULL + a scaled\nswp_offset().\n\nSince commit bea67dcc5eea (\"mm: attempt to batch free swap entries for\nzap_pte_range()\"), zap_pte_range() -\u003e swap_pte_batch() calls\nlookup_swap_cgroup_id() on any non-present, non-none PTE that decodes as a\nreal swap entry, without first validating it against swap_info[]. A\nsingle PTE corrupted into a type-0 swap entry takes the host down at\nprocess exit.\n\nWe hit this in production on a swapless 6.12.58 host: ~1s of\n\"get_swap_device: Bad swap file entry 3f800204222bb\" (do_swap_page() being\ncorrectly defensive about the same entry) followed by\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000003f800204220\n RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x2b/0x60\n Call Trace:\n swap_pte_batch+0xbf/0x230\n zap_pte_range+0x4c8/0x780\n unmap_page_range+0x190/0x3e0\n exit_mmap+0xd9/0x3c0\n do_exit+0x20c/0x4b0\n\nsyzbot has reported the identical stack.\n\nThe source of the PTE corruption is a separate bug; this change makes the\nteardown path as robust as the fault path already is. Every other caller\nof lookup_swap_cgroup_id() is downstream of a get_swap_device() that has\nalready validated the entry, so the new branch is cold.",
"id": "GHSA-fp4w-89fw-h8p4",
"modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64416"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63b02a9409cb5180398491b093e48bcb5315f5fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4196d19f477524d2f92adca90fc1fbe9a0420a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/818416fef38759f23210de449663cd9d7e293d39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b415c00bf23df577a4a95673d00ae76687bcc1d4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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