GHSA-CQ44-X9VF-FPQG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-05 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-05 21:31
VLAI
Details
MikroTik RouterOS accepts malformed RSA/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures during X.509 validation. Because its trust store includes an e=3 root CA, an attacker controlling or redirecting an outbound RouterOS TLS connection can use the root’s public certificate - without its private key - to forge a trusted intermediate and issue certificates for arbitrary hostnames, enabling TLS server impersonation.
This issue was fixed in versions: 6.49.21 (Long-term), 7.23.4 (Long-term) and 7.24.2 (Stable)
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67278"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-05T20:17:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "MikroTik RouterOS accepts malformed RSA/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures during X.509 validation. Because its trust store includes an e=3 root CA, an attacker controlling or redirecting an outbound RouterOS TLS connection can use the root\u2019s public certificate - without its private key - to forge a trusted intermediate and issue certificates for arbitrary hostnames, enabling TLS server impersonation.\n\nThis issue was fixed in versions:\u00a06.49.21 (Long-term),\u00a07.23.4 (Long-term)\u00a0and\u00a07.24.2 (Stable)",
"id": "GHSA-cq44-x9vf-fpqg",
"modified": "2026-09-05T21:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-05T21:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67278"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/mikrotik-routeros-cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/6-49-21-long-term-is-released/272802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-23-4-long-term-is-released/272801"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-24-2-stable-is-released/272800"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mikrotik.com/supportsec/september-2026-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://npratley.net/reversing-mikrotiks-silent-patch-the-routeros-7-23-4-fix-they-wouldnt-explain"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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