GHSA-CJ4H-CH85-55P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-10 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: Gadget: core: Help prevent panic during UVC unconfigure
Avichal Rakesh reported a kernel panic that occurred when the UVC gadget driver was removed from a gadget's configuration. The panic involves a somewhat complicated interaction between the kernel driver and a userspace component (as described in the Link tag below), but the analysis did make one thing clear: The Gadget core should accomodate gadget drivers calling usb_gadget_deactivate() as part of their unbind procedure.
Currently this doesn't work. gadget_unbind_driver() calls driver->unbind() while holding the udc->connect_lock mutex, and usb_gadget_deactivate() attempts to acquire that mutex, which will result in a deadlock.
The simple fix is for gadget_unbind_driver() to release the mutex when invoking the ->unbind() callback. There is no particular reason for it to be holding the mutex at that time, and the mutex isn't held while the ->bind() callback is invoked. So we'll drop the mutex before performing the unbind callback and reacquire it afterward.
We'll also add a couple of comments to usb_gadget_activate() and usb_gadget_deactivate(). Because they run in process context they must not be called from a gadget driver's ->disconnect() callback, which (according to the kerneldoc for struct usb_gadget_driver in include/linux/usb/gadget.h) may run in interrupt context. This may help prevent similar bugs from arising in the future.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53580"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-04T16:15:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: Gadget: core: Help prevent panic during UVC unconfigure\n\nAvichal Rakesh reported a kernel panic that occurred when the UVC\ngadget driver was removed from a gadget\u0027s configuration. The panic\ninvolves a somewhat complicated interaction between the kernel driver\nand a userspace component (as described in the Link tag below), but\nthe analysis did make one thing clear: The Gadget core should\naccomodate gadget drivers calling usb_gadget_deactivate() as part of\ntheir unbind procedure.\n\nCurrently this doesn\u0027t work. gadget_unbind_driver() calls\ndriver-\u003eunbind() while holding the udc-\u003econnect_lock mutex, and\nusb_gadget_deactivate() attempts to acquire that mutex, which will\nresult in a deadlock.\n\nThe simple fix is for gadget_unbind_driver() to release the mutex when\ninvoking the -\u003eunbind() callback. There is no particular reason for\nit to be holding the mutex at that time, and the mutex isn\u0027t held\nwhile the -\u003ebind() callback is invoked. So we\u0027ll drop the mutex\nbefore performing the unbind callback and reacquire it afterward.\n\nWe\u0027ll also add a couple of comments to usb_gadget_activate() and\nusb_gadget_deactivate(). Because they run in process context they\nmust not be called from a gadget driver\u0027s -\u003edisconnect() callback,\nwhich (according to the kerneldoc for struct usb_gadget_driver in\ninclude/linux/usb/gadget.h) may run in interrupt context. This may\nhelp prevent similar bugs from arising in the future.",
"id": "GHSA-cj4h-ch85-55p9",
"modified": "2026-02-10T15:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-10-04T18:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53580"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65dadb2beeb7360232b09ebc4585b54475dfee06"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c1edc00db65f6d4408b3d1cd845e8da3b9e0ca4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bed19d95fcb9c98dfaa9585922b39a2dfba7898d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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