ghsa-c665-4pj5-3qjq
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-07-16 12:30
Modified
2024-08-07 21:31
Severity ?
7.0 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme: fix a possible use-after-free in controller reset during load

Unlike .queue_rq, in .submit_async_event drivers may not check the ctrl readiness for AER submission. This may lead to a use-after-free condition that was observed with nvme-tcp.

The race condition may happen in the following scenario: 1. driver executes its reset_ctrl_work 2. -> nvme_stop_ctrl - flushes ctrl async_event_work 3. ctrl sends AEN which is received by the host, which in turn schedules AEN handling 4. teardown admin queue (which releases the queue socket) 5. AEN processed, submits another AER, calling the driver to submit 6. driver attempts to send the cmd ==> use-after-free

In order to fix that, add ctrl state check to validate the ctrl is actually able to accept the AER submission.

This addresses the above race in controller resets because the driver during teardown should: 1. change ctrl state to RESETTING 2. flush async_event_work (as well as other async work elements)

So after 1,2, any other AER command will find the ctrl state to be RESETTING and bail out without submitting the AER.

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48790"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T12:15:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: fix a possible use-after-free in controller reset during load\n\nUnlike .queue_rq, in .submit_async_event drivers may not check the ctrl\nreadiness for AER submission. This may lead to a use-after-free\ncondition that was observed with nvme-tcp.\n\nThe race condition may happen in the following scenario:\n1. driver executes its reset_ctrl_work\n2. -\u003e nvme_stop_ctrl - flushes ctrl async_event_work\n3. ctrl sends AEN which is received by the host, which in turn\n   schedules AEN handling\n4. teardown admin queue (which releases the queue socket)\n5. AEN processed, submits another AER, calling the driver to submit\n6. driver attempts to send the cmd\n==\u003e use-after-free\n\nIn order to fix that, add ctrl state check to validate the ctrl\nis actually able to accept the AER submission.\n\nThis addresses the above race in controller resets because the driver\nduring teardown should:\n1. change ctrl state to RESETTING\n2. flush async_event_work (as well as other async work elements)\n\nSo after 1,2, any other AER command will find the\nctrl state to be RESETTING and bail out without submitting the AER.",
  "id": "GHSA-c665-4pj5-3qjq",
  "modified": "2024-08-07T21:31:43Z",
  "published": "2024-07-16T12:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48790"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ead57ceb21bbf15963b4874c2ac67143455382f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fa0f99fc84e41057cbdd2efbfe91c6b2f47dd9d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70356b756a58704e5c8818cb09da5854af87e765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e956a2596ae276124ef0d96829c013dd0faf861"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a25e460fbb0340488d119fb2e28fe3f829b7417e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e043fb5a0336ee74614e26f0d9f36f1f5bb6d606"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.