GHSA-9WM7-G2V6-VPRF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref
l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan->conn. If the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending, chan->conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer worker attempts to lock conn->lock:
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318 | Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83 | | CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full) | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 | Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout | Call Trace: | | instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline] | atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline] | __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline] | mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318 | l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422 | process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline] | process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 | worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490 | kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436 | ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 | ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 | | | Allocated by task 320: | l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075 | l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452 | hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline] | hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760 | hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline] | hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847 | hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040 | process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline] | process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 | worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490 | kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436 | ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 | ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 | | Freed by task 322: | hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline] | hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736 | hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405 | hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline] | hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679 | vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690 | __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510 | task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233 | get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810 | arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 | __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline] | exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98 | do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 | entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f | | The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400 | which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 | The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of | freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600)
Fix it by having chan->conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn remains alive as long as the channel exists.
A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the ch ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64434"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref\n\nl2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan-\u003econn. If\nthe connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending,\nchan-\u003econn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer\nworker attempts to lock conn-\u003elock:\n\n| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]\n| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]\n| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]\n| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318\n| Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83\n|\n| CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full)\n| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014\n| Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout\n| Call Trace:\n| \u003cTASK\u003e\n| instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]\n| atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]\n| __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]\n| mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318\n| l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422\n| process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]\n| process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409\n| worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490\n| kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436\n| ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158\n| ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n| \u003c/TASK\u003e\n|\n| Allocated by task 320:\n| l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075\n| l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452\n| hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline]\n| hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760\n| hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline]\n| hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847\n| hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040\n| process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]\n| process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409\n| worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490\n| kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436\n| ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158\n| ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n|\n| Freed by task 322:\n| hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline]\n| hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736\n| hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405\n| hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline]\n| hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679\n| vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690\n| __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510\n| task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233\n| get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810\n| arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337\n| __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline]\n| exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98\n| do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100\n| entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n|\n| The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400\n| which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512\n| The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of\n| freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600)\n\nFix it by having chan-\u003econn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via\nl2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and\nreleasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn\nremains alive as long as the channel exists.\n\nA new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the ch\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-9wm7-g2v6-vprf",
"modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:37Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64434"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b0e2bf39cf99e458d991b9df253727e036a7d7d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50c38d9f42a529691e4e67ea9cedf4f0bfc8d277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91047a4396a8b1857a6f712a90cf33ec0012b189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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