GHSA-9Q2P-VC84-2RWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 19:54 – Updated: 2026-03-09 19:54OpenClaw's system.run allowlist analysis did not honor POSIX shell comment semantics when deriving allow-always persistence entries.
A caller in security=allowlist mode who received an allow-always decision could submit a shell command whose tail was commented out at runtime, for example by using an unquoted # before a chained payload. The runtime shell would execute only the pre-comment portion, but allowlist persistence could still analyze and store the non-executed tail as a trusted follow-up command.
Latest published npm version: 2026.3.2
Fixed on main on March 7, 2026 in 939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7 by teaching shell tokenization and chain/pipeline analysis to stop at unquoted shell comments, so allow-always persistence now tracks only commands that the shell can actually execute. Normal real chained commands and quoted # literals continue to work.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.3.2 - Patched version:
>= 2026.3.7
Fix Commit(s)
939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7
Release Process Note
npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.
Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:54:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "OpenClaw\u0027s `system.run` allowlist analysis did not honor POSIX shell comment semantics when deriving `allow-always` persistence entries.\n\nA caller in `security=allowlist` mode who received an `allow-always` decision could submit a shell command whose tail was commented out at runtime, for example by using an unquoted `#` before a chained payload. The runtime shell would execute only the pre-comment portion, but allowlist persistence could still analyze and store the non-executed tail as a trusted follow-up command.\n\nLatest published npm version: `2026.3.2`\n\nFixed on `main` on March 7, 2026 in `939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7` by teaching shell tokenization and chain/pipeline analysis to stop at unquoted shell comments, so allow-always persistence now tracks only commands that the shell can actually execute. Normal real chained commands and quoted `#` literals continue to work.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.3.7`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm",
"modified": "2026-03-09T19:54:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-09T19:54:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/939b18475d734ed75173f59507e3ebbdfe1992b7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: system.run allow-always persistence included shell-commented payload tails"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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