GHSA-9PGC-3CCV-5297
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 20:09 – Updated: 2026-05-29 20:09Impact
DNSIncoming._decode_labels_at_offset recurses once per DNS-name compression pointer (RFC 1035 §4.1.4). Pointer cycles and label counts were capped, but the chain length of unique forward pointers was not. A single ~3 kB mDNS packet carrying ~1500 chained pointers drives the recursion past CPython's default limit, and RecursionError was not listed in DECODE_EXCEPTIONS, so it escaped DNSIncoming.__init__ and was logged by asyncio's default exception handler.
Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, 224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) can degrade the mDNS listener; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. Replaying at a few hertz produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade while the attack is in flight.
Patches
Fixed in zeroconf 0.149.5 (PR #1719).
Upgrade to >= 0.149.5.
Workarounds
There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.
Resources
- PR #1719, fix
- Issue #1713, public tracking issue
- RFC 1035 §4.1.4, RFC 6762, CWE-674
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "zeroconf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.149.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T20:09:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`DNSIncoming._decode_labels_at_offset` recurses once per DNS-name compression pointer (RFC 1035 \u00a74.1.4). Pointer cycles and label counts were capped, but the chain length of unique forward pointers was not. A single ~3 kB mDNS packet carrying ~1500 chained pointers drives the recursion past CPython\u0027s default limit, and `RecursionError` was not listed in `DECODE_EXCEPTIONS`, so it escaped `DNSIncoming.__init__` and was logged by asyncio\u0027s default exception handler.\n\nAny unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can degrade the mDNS listener; that includes a guest on the same Wi-Fi, a compromised IoT device, or a container on a shared bridge. Replaying at a few hertz produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding, and mDNS-dependent features (HomeKit, Chromecast/Matter, AirPlay, printers) degrade while the attack is in flight.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.5 ([PR #1719](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1719)).\nUpgrade to `\u003e= 0.149.5`.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules.\n\n### Resources\n- [PR #1719](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1719), fix\n- [Issue #1713](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/issues/1713), public tracking issue\n- [RFC 1035 \u00a74.1.4](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035#section-4.1.4), [RFC 6762](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762), [CWE-674](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/674.html)",
"id": "GHSA-9pgc-3ccv-5297",
"modified": "2026-05-29T20:09:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T20:09:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/security/advisories/GHSA-9pgc-3ccv-5297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/issues/1713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1719"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "zeroconf has unbounded recursion in DNS compression-pointer decoder that allows LAN-local denial of service"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.