GHSA-946X-47HF-5C7P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: cec: stm32: prevent out-of-bounds write on RX overflow
stm32_rx_done() appends each received CEC byte to rx_msg.msg[] using rx_msg.len as the write index, incrementing it on every RXBR (receive-byte-ready) interrupt without checking it against the buffer size:
cec->rx_msg.msg[cec->rx_msg.len++] = val & 0xFF;
rx_msg.msg[] is a fixed CEC_MAX_MSG_SIZE (16) byte array in struct cec_msg, and rx_msg.len is only reset on RXACKE/RXOVR or after a completed message (RXEND). The number of bytes received before RXEND is decided by the remote CEC device (it sets EOM), not by the driver. A peer that keeps sending bytes without ending the message drives RXBR repeatedly, pushing rx_msg.len past 16 and writing peer-controlled bytes out of bounds into the surrounding memory. This is reachable in normal operation once the driver has probed and receiving is enabled, from the IRQ thread, without any local privilege.
The length check in the CEC core runs on the consumer side, after the byte has been stored, so it does not prevent the overflow. Bound the index in the driver before the store, as the other platform CEC drivers already do (e.g. tegra_cec), dropping the excess bytes of an overlong frame.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89725"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:20:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: cec: stm32: prevent out-of-bounds write on RX overflow\n\nstm32_rx_done() appends each received CEC byte to rx_msg.msg[] using\nrx_msg.len as the write index, incrementing it on every RXBR\n(receive-byte-ready) interrupt without checking it against the buffer\nsize:\n\n\tcec-\u003erx_msg.msg[cec-\u003erx_msg.len++] = val \u0026 0xFF;\n\nrx_msg.msg[] is a fixed CEC_MAX_MSG_SIZE (16) byte array in struct\ncec_msg, and rx_msg.len is only reset on RXACKE/RXOVR or after a\ncompleted message (RXEND). The number of bytes received before RXEND is\ndecided by the remote CEC device (it sets EOM), not by the driver. A\npeer that keeps sending bytes without ending the message drives RXBR\nrepeatedly, pushing rx_msg.len past 16 and writing peer-controlled bytes\nout of bounds into the surrounding memory. This is reachable in normal\noperation once the driver has probed and receiving is enabled, from the\nIRQ thread, without any local privilege.\n\nThe length check in the CEC core runs on the consumer side, after the\nbyte has been stored, so it does not prevent the overflow. Bound the\nindex in the driver before the store, as the other platform CEC drivers\nalready do (e.g. tegra_cec), dropping the excess bytes of an overlong\nframe.\n\nFound by static analysis tool CodeQL.",
"id": "GHSA-946x-47hf-5c7p",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89725"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c260d3f97e52978a8c769bb095ac0901333a3ac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b4fdefd788db990d1805feb5c7b2388de791ecd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37ac45f7d6e3a6a5dcf6452a0b7bad9a543e8344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3df1a4026662121011187247897fe95fd84e8a3a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a85ce3b175615c2e13bc01e8a1b6b6b6910fde57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3edd7fb8e3692423a702705509947fc9c30b3d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2499b720ea9b874d58770885c6c2e8445a8c3ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb9dda38d4b9e90db07ed9a0ee2d35bf85494035"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.