GHSA-8J65-CC62-W2HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix CS held asserted and state leaks
In ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(), set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) and disable_one() were called from the out: block while keep_cs_asserted was still true. This caused any SPI transfer issued by those callbacks to carry cs_change=1, leaving CS permanently asserted after the conversion. Fix by moving both calls into the out_unlock: block, after keep_cs_asserted is cleared, matching the pattern already used in ad_sd_calibrate().
In the error path of ad_sd_buffer_postenable(), if an operation fails after set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_CONTINUOUS) has already succeeded (e.g. spi_offload_trigger_enable()), the device is left in continuous conversion mode with CS physically asserted. Additionally, bus_locked remaining true after spi_bus_unlock() causes subsequent SPI operations to call spi_sync_locked() without the bus lock actually held, allowing concurrent SPI access.
Fix the error path by clearing keep_cs_asserted first, then calling set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) to revert the device mode and deassert CS, then clearing bus_locked before releasing the bus.
For devices that implement neither set_mode nor disable_one (such as MAX11205, which has no physical CS pin), no SPI transfer is issued during cleanup and the cs_change flag has no effect on any physical line.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64501"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:36Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix CS held asserted and state leaks\n\nIn ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(), set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) and\ndisable_one() were called from the out: block while keep_cs_asserted\nwas still true. This caused any SPI transfer issued by those callbacks\nto carry cs_change=1, leaving CS permanently asserted after the\nconversion. Fix by moving both calls into the out_unlock: block, after\nkeep_cs_asserted is cleared, matching the pattern already used in\nad_sd_calibrate().\n\nIn the error path of ad_sd_buffer_postenable(), if an operation fails\nafter set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_CONTINUOUS) has already succeeded (e.g.\nspi_offload_trigger_enable()), the device is left in continuous\nconversion mode with CS physically asserted. Additionally,\nbus_locked remaining true after spi_bus_unlock() causes subsequent\nSPI operations to call spi_sync_locked() without the bus lock actually\nheld, allowing concurrent SPI access.\n\nFix the error path by clearing keep_cs_asserted first, then calling\nset_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) to revert the device mode and deassert CS,\nthen clearing bus_locked before releasing the bus.\n\nFor devices that implement neither set_mode nor disable_one (such as\nMAX11205, which has no physical CS pin), no SPI transfer is issued\nduring cleanup and the cs_change flag has no effect on any physical\nline.",
"id": "GHSA-8j65-cc62-w2hg",
"modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:38Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64501"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c313bb7c38855e94ceef939d152dd75e5a904b5f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c72da0688575e5ef39c36bb44fed53aa18f8ae65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1de829ee87a1198d3465493ce430d36c5fa029c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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