GHSA-8FXQ-53RX-PH5F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:34 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:34
VLAI
Summary
Coder: Login endpoint user enumeration via timing-defense placeholder in password comparison
Details

Summary

userpassword.Compare() substituted a placeholder hash derived from the well-known string "hunter2" when the stored hash was empty. Submitting "hunter2" therefore matched accounts with no password hash (nonexistent users and SSO-only users) and a subsequent login-type check returned an HTTP 403 that disclosed the account's login type, versus 401 for password users.

Note: Practical exploitation is limited because the timing side channel is noisy and only reveals whether an account exists.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts and their authentication provider by submitting logins with the password "hunter2", distinguishing nonexistent users, SSO users (provider revealed) and password users from the response. This aids credential-stuffing and targeted phishing. No authentication bypass or data access resulted.

Patches

The fix derives the timing-defense placeholder from a secure random value that no supplied password can match.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line Patched version
2.34 v2.34.2
2.33 v2.33.8
2.32 v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR) v2.29.17

Workarounds

None.

References

  • Fix: #26205

Credits

We'd like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22433) for independently disclosing this issue!

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.29.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:34:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`userpassword.Compare()` substituted a placeholder hash derived from the well-known string `\"hunter2\"` when the stored hash was empty. Submitting `\"hunter2\"` therefore matched accounts with no password hash (nonexistent users and SSO-only users) and a subsequent login-type check returned an HTTP 403 that disclosed the account\u0027s login type, versus 401 for password users.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Practical exploitation is limited because the timing side channel is noisy and only reveals whether an account exists.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts and their authentication provider by submitting logins with the password `\"hunter2\"`, distinguishing nonexistent users, SSO users (provider revealed) and password users from the response. This aids credential-stuffing and targeted phishing. No authentication bypass or data access resulted.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix derives the timing-defense placeholder from a secure random value that no supplied password can match.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |\n| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.\n\n### References\n\n- Fix: #26205\n\n### Credits\n\nWe\u0027d like to thank Anthropic\u0027s Security Team (ANT-2026-22433) for independently disclosing this issue!",
  "id": "GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T18:34:21Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T18:34:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26205"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/35a7dc8ab9c7f15ce05d963947823ee31224512f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Coder: Login endpoint user enumeration via timing-defense placeholder in password comparison"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…