GHSA-8FRP-2M2W-WR4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-08 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlink
During async unlink, we drop the i_nlink counter before we receive
the completion (that will eventually update the i_nlink) because "we
assume that the unlink will succeed". That is not a bad idea, but it
races against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of
our own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like
this one:
WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 Modules linked in: CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655 Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720 sp : ffff80012173bc90 x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680 x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203 x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365 x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74 x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94 x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002 x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P) vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8 do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158
In ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the CEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion.
Meanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a
worker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or
just a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own
completion). These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the
i_nlink counter to the value received from the MDS. If that new
i_nlink value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it
further. But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then.
The WARNING can be reproduced this way:
- Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected. Having no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the MDS wouldn't give me the "Fxr" capabilities, so I patched get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed.
(Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel, without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.)
- Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink
completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is
called. This guarantees that the
i_nlinkis already zero before drop_nlink() runs.
The solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero,
but doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU). Since
ceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the
ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this
seems like the proper lock to protect the i_nlink updates.
I found prior art in NFS and SMB (using inode.i_lock) and AFS (using
afs_vnode.cb_lock). All three have the zero check as well.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43420"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T15:16:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlink\n\nDuring async unlink, we drop the `i_nlink` counter before we receive\nthe completion (that will eventually update the `i_nlink`) because \"we\nassume that the unlink will succeed\". That is not a bad idea, but it\nraces against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of\nour own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like\nthis one:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68\n Modules linked in:\n CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655\n Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023\n pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68\n lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720\n sp : ffff80012173bc90\n x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680\n x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647\n x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203\n x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365\n x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec\n x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74\n x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94\n x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002\n x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8\n Call trace:\n drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P)\n vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8\n do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288\n __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80\n invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8\n do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8\n el0_svc+0x18/0x58\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130\n el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158\n\nIn ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the\nCEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion.\n\nMeanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a\nworker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or\njust a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own\ncompletion). These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the\n`i_nlink` counter to the value received from the MDS. If that new\n`i_nlink` value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it\nfurther. But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then.\n\nThe WARNING can be reproduced this way:\n\n1. Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected. Having\n no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the\n MDS wouldn\u0027t give me the \"Fxr\" capabilities, so I patched\n get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed.\n\n (Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel,\n without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.)\n\n2. Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink\n completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is\n called. This guarantees that the `i_nlink` is already zero before\n drop_nlink() runs.\n\nThe solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero,\nbut doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU). Since\nceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the\n`ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock` spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this\nseems like the proper lock to protect the `i_nlink` updates.\n\nI found prior art in NFS and SMB (using `inode.i_lock`) and AFS (using\n`afs_vnode.cb_lock`). All three have the zero check as well.",
"id": "GHSA-8frp-2m2w-wr4j",
"modified": "2026-05-08T15:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d5fd8bb574bef039eb3b738e523870433a2aeb9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7db008e85a5d17b64bc5390b828bf457ae91a415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8975b85b0d45ca811ace6fac5907652f2310e5ac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b31e88ac5623d15c8bc46f69dfe1d3b43a8f67c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aedd29386b23f3e1e6818943e11abfff2953732f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3f5513141ecc6b277a8f7b7efe58a0cf9a5e859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce0123cbb4a40a2f1bbb815f292b26e96088639f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcc477a6e8856c8a42b3c9e171724d8d6dfadd06"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.