GHSA-8737-2W76-FPFM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver

The udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget, but their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where usb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work) while gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory (e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a NULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed:

[39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140 [39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60 ... [39430.911890][ T1171] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8 [39430.911910][ T1171] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140 [39430.931308][ T1171] configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134

[39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode [39430.957287][ T1171] dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c [39430.957304][ T1171] __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664

Fix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the gadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new usb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added, usb_add_gadget() stores the gadget's release routine in the udc structure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is released, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and then calls the gadget's release routine.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64346"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:16Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver\n\nThe udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget,\nbut their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where\nusb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work)\nwhile gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory\n(e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a\nNULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed:\n\n[39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000\n[39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140\n[39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60\n...\n[39430.911890][ T1171]  usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8\n[39430.911910][ T1171]  gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140\n[39430.931308][ T1171]  configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134\n\n[39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode\n[39430.957287][ T1171]  dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c\n[39430.957304][ T1171]  __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664\n\nFix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the\ngadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new\nusb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added,\nusb_add_gadget() stores the gadget\u0027s release routine in the udc\nstructure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is\nreleased, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and\nthen calls the gadget\u0027s release routine.",
  "id": "GHSA-8737-2w76-fpfm",
  "modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:32Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64346"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50eeb8e8a4f389efc91b93cff14a683e714ec194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54fa390aae393eb130f307a85562e3001cc39a52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67e511d2989eb1c8c588b599ce2fcc6bb8e6f7ea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a5214dae906d9f58e07bc4995e8181ee74439f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b52476a83d9e12df00765359d728a875b128bef1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d026f71df141c9b064ff32a78af5391a31ef75c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f845852a5a8914277031f47d8de0f350fef52405"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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