GHSA-84C3-J8R2-MCM8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-26 20:10 – Updated: 2024-02-26 20:10
VLAI
Summary
@nfid/embed has compromised private key due to @dfinity/auth-client producing insecure session keys
Details

Problem

User sessions in the @nfid/embed SDK with Ed25519 keys are vulnerable due to a compromised private key 535yc-uxytb-gfk7h-tny7p-vjkoe-i4krp-3qmcl-uqfgr-cpgej-yqtjq-rqe. This exposes users to potential loss of funds on ledgers and unauthorized access to canisters they control.

Solution

Using version >1.0.1 of @dfinity/auth-client and @dfinity/identity packages, or @nfid/embed >0.10.1-alpha.6 includes patched versions of the issue.

User sessions will be automatically fixed when they re-authenticate.

Why this happened

The DFINITY auth client library provides a function, Ed25519KeyIdentity.generate, for generating an Ed25519 key pair. This function includes an optional parameter to supply a 32-byte seed value, which will be utilized as the secret key. In cases where no seed value is provided, the library is expected to generate the secret key using secure randomness. However, a recent update of DFINITY libraries has compromised this assurance by employing an insecure seed for key pair generation.

References

AgentJS CVE

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nfid/embed"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.1-alpha.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-321",
      "CWE-330"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-26T20:10:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Problem\nUser sessions in the @nfid/embed SDK with Ed25519 keys are vulnerable due to a compromised private key `535yc-uxytb-gfk7h-tny7p-vjkoe-i4krp-3qmcl-uqfgr-cpgej-yqtjq-rqe`. This exposes users to potential loss of funds on ledgers and unauthorized access to canisters they control.\n\n### Solution\nUsing version \u003e1.0.1 of @dfinity/auth-client and @dfinity/identity packages, or @nfid/embed \u003e0.10.1-alpha.6 includes patched versions of the issue.\n\nUser sessions will be automatically fixed when they re-authenticate.\n\n### Why this happened\nThe DFINITY auth client library provides a function, `Ed25519KeyIdentity.generate`, for generating an Ed25519 key pair. This function includes an optional parameter to supply a 32-byte seed value, which will be utilized as the secret key. In cases where no seed value is provided, the library is expected to generate the secret key using secure randomness. However, a recent update of DFINITY libraries has compromised this assurance by employing an insecure seed for key pair generation.\n\n### References\n[AgentJS CVE ](https://github.com/dfinity/agent-js/security/advisories/GHSA-c9vv-fhgv-cjc3)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-84c3-j8r2-mcm8",
  "modified": "2024-02-26T20:10:10Z",
  "published": "2024-02-26T20:10:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dfinity/agent-js/security/advisories/GHSA-c9vv-fhgv-cjc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/internet-identity-labs/sdk-ts/security/advisories/GHSA-84c3-j8r2-mcm8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/internet-identity-labs/sdk-ts"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@nfid/embed has compromised private key due to @dfinity/auth-client producing insecure session keys"
}



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