GHSA-7R96-8G3X-G36M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-28 17:16 – Updated: 2026-01-23 22:42Impact
The verifyWithMessage method of tEnvoyNaClSigningKey always returns true for any signature of a SHA-512 hash matching the SHA-512 hash of the message even if the signature is invalid.
Patches
Upgrade to v7.0.3 immediately to resolve this issue. Since the vulnerability lies within the verification method, the previous signatures are still valid. We highly recommend reverifying any signatures that were previously verified with the vulnerable verifyWithMessage method.
Workarounds
In tenvoy.js under the verifyWithMessage method definition within the tEnvoyNaClSigningKey class, ensure that the return statement call to this.verify ends in .verified. For example, the return statement should start with return this.verify(signed, password).verified && instead of return this.verify(signed, password) &&.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tenvoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-16T20:14:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe `verifyWithMessage` method of `tEnvoyNaClSigningKey` always returns `true` for any signature of a SHA-512 hash matching the SHA-512 hash of the message even if the signature is invalid.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to `v7.0.3` immediately to resolve this issue. Since the vulnerability lies within the verification method, the previous signatures are still valid. We highly recommend reverifying any signatures that were previously verified with the vulnerable `verifyWithMessage` method.\n\n### Workarounds\nIn `tenvoy.js` under the `verifyWithMessage` method definition within the `tEnvoyNaClSigningKey` class, ensure that the return statement call to `this.verify` ends in `.verified`. For example, the return statement should start with `return this.verify(signed, password).verified \u0026\u0026 ` instead of `return this.verify(signed, password) \u0026\u0026 `.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy](https://github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy)",
"id": "GHSA-7r96-8g3x-g36m",
"modified": "2026-01-23T22:42:09Z",
"published": "2021-06-28T17:16:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy/security/advisories/GHSA-7r96-8g3x-g36m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy/commit/a121b34a45e289d775c62e58841522891dee686b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TogaTech/tEnvoy/releases/tag/v7.0.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.