GHSA-6FMJ-X4Q6-PP6W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak
fdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the i2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious, counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size (directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip and the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length outside [FDP_NCI_I2C_MIN_PAYLOAD, FDP_NCI_I2C_MAX_PAYLOAD], as a corrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.
The same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length packet followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets in one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites it. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80802"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:07Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak\n\nfdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied\nbytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the\ni2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious,\ncounterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can\ndrive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that\nclobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size\n(directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip\nand the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length\noutside [FDP_NCI_I2C_MIN_PAYLOAD, FDP_NCI_I2C_MAX_PAYLOAD], as a\ncorrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.\n\nThe same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length\npacket followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets\nin one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites\nit. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.",
"id": "GHSA-6fmj-x4q6-pp6w",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d723090645b82c1cb27cfd7ebf81f0e7c96bcae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1aa3fc769b0c45bd19f8dab1697084c2b3f6d706"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fc32327b927a6e2cde086f82575c29880844228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ad21dcfeb5181af0c3ee2608808c0c0a5283aa1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d2c243b79854628ff076c38748c020042f02f57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9498ab9a78cb63d78dbe4f221d8cc6c91f285ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db7e464b350969c6ea8340de00d9796e5fd5123b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5eec121f2c3bc4c7022613bedd9121a8aa4c949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc3c2bd5b1ec6c7cbc8a50e32d9bcec114f25463"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.